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SEPTEMBER, 1974

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1974

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the people of all countries and unfavorable to imperialism, modern revisionists and all reaction.

We must uphold proletarian internationalism . . . strengthen our unity with the countries subjected to imperialist aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying and form the broadest united front against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism and in particular against the hegemonism of the two superpowers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Finally, in the communiqué, the congress called on all elements of the nation to “be on guard against the outbreak of an imperialist world war and particularly against surprise attacks by social-imperialism. . . .”² Peking had returned to the “dual adversary” concept of the 1960’s, by virtue of which both the United States and the Soviet Union were classified as “principal enemies,” and had decided that the awakening Third World could be enlisted as China’s ally in the coming confrontation.

In the months that followed, public statements by various high Chinese officials held to, and elaborated upon, the new policy line, and in the end it was established beyond ambiguity or misunderstanding. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1973, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua held that there was “only a travesty of peaceful coexistence” between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—“coexisting in rivalry.” He contended that the basic contradictions between imperialism and the oppressed nations, as well as between the two superpowers, were sharpening. “In a word,” he said, “we consider that the characteristic of the present situation is one of great disorder throughout the world. . . . And the main trend amidst this great disorder is that countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution.”³

There was a modification of tactics in Peking’s current approach to the Third World: in contradistinction to its bid of the 1960’s for leadership, the PRC would for the present be content with membership. When Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere visited Peking in March, 1974, for instance, the official *People’s Daily* “repeated the formula the Chinese use when they play host to African leaders. ‘China is a developing country,’ it said, ‘and belongs to the third world.’”⁴ At a banquet in honor of the visitor, Chou En-lai castigated both superpowers, and held that they would not succeed in establishing world hegemony. The United States, “assailed by internal as well as external difficulties, drags out a painful existence; the other [the U.S.S.R.], nourishing mad am-

bitions beyond its powers, extends its tentacles everywhere but everywhere sustains reverses; it finds itself in an extremely grievous situation.”⁵

The Chinese theme was further developed by Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing in an address of April 10, 1974, to the U.N. special session on raw materials and development—matters of special interest to developing nations. Teng set forth the Chinese position in sweeping terms. He asserted that: “As a result of the emergence of social imperialism, the socialist camp which existed for a time after World War II is no longer in existence. . . . the Western imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating.” He noted a new division of the world into three parts:

three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the first world. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions make up the third world. The developed countries between the two make up the second world.⁶

This was an amended version of the Maoist doctrine set forth by Defense Minister Lin Piao in his September, 1965, essay, “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!” In Lin’s exposition, the socialist world confronted imperialist America across an intermediate zone comprising two parts—the agrarian, developing nations, and the industrialized capitalist countries other than the United States. Now China claimed to be simply an integral part of the Third World, opposed to both superpowers, while the socialist camp to which China had once belonged had, by Teng’s sleight-of-hand, disappeared.

The rest of the Teng address was pro forma. The world is in a state of turbulence; there can be no peace while imperialism and social imperialism remain in existence; but, since the two are contending for world hegemony,

the contradiction between them is irreconcilable; one either overpowers the other or is overpowered. Their compromise and collusion can only be partial, temporary and relative, while their contention is all-embracing, permanent and absolute.⁷

This political vision makes only cramped provision for “peaceful coexistence.” In this situation, Peking has maneuvered to exacerbate tensions between the superpowers. Influential Western visitors to Peking have regularly been treated to exposés of an alleged impending menace of Soviet military aggression. In receiving French President Georges Pompidou on the occasion of his visit to China in September, 1973, Premier Chou set forth the argument that “the tendency toward war remains and the détente is no more than a superficial phenomenon,” and he said that “we [Chinese] must therefore make all preparations to resist a war of aggression.”

² *Ibid.*, August 30, 1973.

³ Robert Allen, *ibid.*, October 3, 1973.

⁴ Joseph Lelyveld, *ibid.*, April 4, 1974.

⁵ Alain Bouc, *Le Monde*, March 26, 1974.

⁶ *The New York Times*, April 12, 1974.

⁷ *Ibid.*, April 12, 1974.

The reporter offered an estimate of his own:

What M. Pompidou heard in China has clearly revealed the desire of Peking to see the tension, the confrontation, the cold war in a word, persist in Europe, to the end that the U.S.S.R., uneasy with respect to the West, could not readily transfer important forces to Asia.⁸

In his report to the party congress, Chou En-lai had said that, "At present, the Soviet revisionists are 'making a feint to the East while attacking in the West.' . . ." It was clear that Peking desired to engage the U.S.S.R. ever more deeply in the West—if possible.

Admittedly, important elements tend to sustain Peking's apocalyptic vision. The events associated with the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973, could only have convinced Mao Tse-tung of the wisdom of his policy decision. And the failure of United States President Richard Nixon and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev to reach any new substantive agreement on arms control during President Nixon's June, 1974, visit to Moscow would be taken as confirmation of Teng's characterization of the persistent nature of the Soviet-American "contention." But China's attempt to assume leadership of a presumably revolutionary Third World during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1965–1969 failed disastrously; and Japan, given her economic power and political position, is clearly in a position to exercise much weight in the scales. In the end, the basic question is whether Mao, Chou and the party apparatus are correct in their estimate that the Third World is of one mind with Peking and that by allying itself to that conglomerate the PRC will be able to overcome both the United States and the Soviet Union in the world arena—if the two do not destroy each other.

The ultimate aim of China's grand strategy has been clear from the beginning: China proposes to become a Great Power in her own right. As things stand at present, she suffers manifest shortcomings. In military terms, China is only a second-rate power. There are unresolved tensions within the ruling hierarchy. Economically, the country is only a developing nation, isolated in large measure, by her own choice, from any major outside source of economic aid. China operates from a position of weakness, and consequently thinks to rely primarily upon others to overcome her principal enemies. In line with Mao's theory of contradictions, therefore, Peking strives either to maneuver its principal enemies into destroying each other, or to mobilize a temporary "united

front" of roughly compatible forces to overwhelm both. But the international situation is more complex than Peking's simplistic analysis, and to judge the merits of Chinese strategy it is essential to view that situation in its related parts.

SINO-SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow, not surprisingly, has responded in kind to Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. It has charged the PRC leadership with being motivated by "Great Han chauvinism," with striving to extend Chinese hegemony over the Third World, with undertaking to mobilize other countries against both the United States and the U.S.S.R. as the two "superpowers," and with designating the Soviet Union as "principal enemy" and striving to embroil it with the United States.⁹

The decisive action will, of course, come not in the propaganda arena, but in fields where the realities of power are exercised. And here it is to be noted that both the American and the Soviet leaderships support the concept that the progressive development of mutually profitable economic exchanges will lead to better political relations. That concept is yet to be disproved. It is highly unlikely (for all of Peking's professed apprehensions) that Moscow would launch a military attack in either the West or the East when there is no cause for desperate measures. It is at least equally improbable that China, militarily so inferior to the U.S.S.R., would in the visible future initiate a war. The military factor can therefore be omitted from consideration for the purposes of this discussion.

In economic terms, which today are reflected increasingly in political influence, the Soviet Union enjoys a clear superiority over China. Its industrial and agricultural power is increasing and its foreign trade is growing. Given its immense natural resources, it holds greater future promise than its Chinese neighbor. It is also supported by the East European socialist bloc and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR).

Peking, in asserting that the "socialist camp" has ceased to exist, is letting the wish be father to the thought: the Maoists patently want the MPR to return to the Chinese fold, and hope that the East European bloc will disintegrate. Through her developing relationships with Albania, Rumania and Yugoslavia, China tries to apply pressure to that end. But the socialist bloc, in its economic aspect, particularly—the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA)—has enjoyed a notable integration and development since its rejuvenation in 1959, and must be regarded as a functioning organization of considerable strength. And it is significant for the future that the CMEA countries have developed a substantial network of mutually profitable economic relations with the Third

⁸ Philippe Devilliers, "Paris et Pékin devant le risque de guerre," *Le Monde-Diplomatique*, October, 1973, pp. 13–14; see also C. L. Sulzberger, "Who's Frightening Whom?" *The New York Times*, May 18, 1974.

⁹ See in this general connection Alain Jacob, *Le Monde*, August 28, 1973, reporting on an article by I. Alexandrov, "Certain directions of the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership," *Pravda*, August 26, 1973.

World. On the record, the concerned developing countries are generally finding the exchanges profitable, and, given the character of national self-interest, it is to be expected that in time these economic relationships will be further expanded.¹⁰

The U.S.S.R., it goes without saying, plays a prominent role in CMEA policy making and operations. The "socialist camp" remains very much in the picture, and fulfills an important function in the field of international economics—particularly with respect to the Third World.

China is also strengthening her economy, but there is a critical comparison to be drawn between her economic strategy and that of the Soviet Union. Whereas Peking insists on maintaining the principle of economic "self-reliance" (to date only slightly qualified) and thus rejects the idea of participation by alien elements in the Chinese economic development, the U.S.S.R. has begun to develop a mode of "economic cooperation" that enlists direct foreign collaboration—and as a consequence it is progressing all the more rapidly. In theory, Peking might choose to adopt the same approach. But such a shift in policy would clash with established Maoist dogma. The fact that China openly professes to anticipate the ultimate destruction of the two superpowers by her revolutionary efforts and those of the Third World tends somewhat to reduce the likelihood that she will be able to engage in an Oriental Marshall Plan designed particularly for the Chinese benefit.

China thus remains, by her own present avowals, a "developing country"—primarily an agricultural country. And, even so, her agriculture remains the vulnerable factor in her economy, as shown by the character of her trade. China's imports from the United States are in large part in the form of agricultural products—wheat, soybeans, corn, raw cotton. In October, 1973, China contracted to buy 224 million bushels of wheat from Canada over the next three years. In spite of being an agricultural country, in sum, China has still not become self-sufficient with respect to her food supply and basic textile materials. With four times the population of the U.S.S.R., she produces only about one-third more grain than does the U.S.S.R.

Another economic datum is relevant. There is now in course a development that is destined to

¹⁰ In this connection, see *Innovations in the Practice of Trade and Economic Co-operation between the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe and the Developing Countries, A Study Presented by the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System (Moscow)*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva (New York: United Nations, 1970).

¹¹ See in this general connection Hedrick Smith, *The New York Times*, April 28, 1972.

¹² See Theodore Shabad, *ibid.*, July 5, 1974.

¹³ See Alain Bouc, "Pekin s'inquiète du jeu diplomatique et militaire de l'U.R.S.S. en Asie," *Le Monde*, July 31, 1973.

change the strategic balance in the Far East: the Soviet Union has undertaken to exploit the economic potential of Siberia. That potential has huge dimensions. Siberia possesses vast deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, timber, and non-ferrous metals. The output of Siberian primary materials is growing.¹¹ The Soviets are also building new port facilities near Nakhodka, and have begun the construction of a rail line—the long-mooted Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM), connecting Taishet on the Trans-Siberian Railway with the port of Vanino on the Pacific.¹²

The Chinese, who have voiced philosophical claims to the ownership of all of eastern Siberia on the grounds that it was once under Manchū influence, have been quick to perceive the long-term political and military as well as economic significance of the program, and have viewed it with undisguised alarm. Chou En-lai, in his report to the tenth party congress, charged that

the Soviet revisionists are . . . stepping up their contention in Europe and their expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and every place their hands can reach.

In the final analysis, however, it is not the Soviet power in Europe that disturbs China, but the Soviet power in Asia.¹³ And it can probably safely be concluded that Peking views current Soviet activities in Siberia as constituting the greatest future threat to the achievement of Chinese national objectives.

Consequently, Peking has regularly, and pointedly, warned Tokyo against Japanese participation in Siberian undertakings that might have military potential—such as assisting in the construction of a large-diameter oil pipeline to connect Tyumen in western Siberia with the Pacific coast, or helping to build the BAM rail line. For a variety of reasons, Tokyo has visibly exercised judicious restraint in the proscribed area. Sino-Japanese trade has built up rapidly, to reach a total value of approximately \$2 billion in 1973. And Peking has repeatedly and publicly (doubtless not without an *arrière-pensée* with regard to its own claim on Soviet territory) voiced support for Japanese re-possession of the Kurile islands.

But the really vital element at work in Japan today

(Continued on page 134)

O. Edmund Clubb spent 18 years in China with the U.S. Foreign Service. He has been Consul General in Vladivostok, the U.S.S.R.; Mukden and Changchun, Manchuria; and in Peking, China. From 1950 to 1952, he was Director of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State. Mr. Clubb is the author of *China and Russia: The "Great Game"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), and *Twentieth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). He has taught at various universities.

"As the linchpin of the Chinese political system, Mao, at 80, is precariously holding the pieces together. . . . Without an arbiter of Mao's stature, the future Chinese leadership will experience more conflict. Under such circumstances, the PLA may again be thrust into the political arena. . . ."

China's Military

BY PARRIS CHANG

Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University

SINCE THE SECOND HALF of the 1960's, Chinese politics have been marked by instability; the leadership of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) has been victimized by several major purges, and political power has been continually redistributed among various groups and leadership hierarchies. To be more specific, in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) during 1966-1969, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) directly intervened in the political arena, assuming many important political roles and, during 1967-1968, even displacing party and government organizations and enforcing direct military rule in the provinces. In spite of such an enormous expansion of the PLA power in China's polity, however, the party leadership under Chairman Mao Tse-tung managed to dispose of the alleged Bonapartist Lin Piao in the fall of 1971 and has gradually circumvented the political roles of the People's Liberation Army and reasserted control by the party over every area of Chinese life.

¹ This essay is part of a longer study on military intervention in Chinese politics since the 1960's, which is in progress. I wish to acknowledge the financial support of the Center for Chinese Study, the University of Michigan, Social Science Research Council, and Liberal Arts Office for Research and Graduate Studies of the Pennsylvania State University for this project.

² Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 16.

³ In the aftermath of the Lin Piao affair, the Chinese propagandists have strongly made such a point in their efforts to reinterpret past events and to re-write history.

⁴ This concept is adopted from E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961). Several scholars of Chinese politics, e.g., Professor Tang Tsou of the University of Chicago and Professor Richard Baum of the University of California at Los Angeles, have applied a similar concept to analyzing Chinese politics since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

What were the political roles performed by the PLA during 1966-1971? How did the party leadership control the PLA during and after the GPCR? What resources and mechanisms does the party possess and employ? What is the state of party-PLA relationship since Lin Piao's downfall? These are the major questions dealt with here.¹

To gain an understanding of the recent drive by the Maoist leadership to reduce the political role of the PLA and to centralize control in China, we must review briefly the PLA's intervention in the GPCR and the PLA leaders' subsequent assumption of political power, particularly in the provinces. It should be noted at the outset that initially the PLA did not seek political power for itself, and that the initial expansion of the PLA's political power falls into the category of what Morris Janowitz calls "reactive militarism."² That is, the PLA gained new political power, not through a premeditated coup ("designed militarism," in Janowitz's definition) as the military has done in many other political systems, but through circumstances largely not of its own making. Although from the outset some PLA leaders may have actually contemplated military intervention to enhance their personal power,³ the expansion of the PLA's political power was a direct result of the pressure of party leaders, especially Mao's.

Thus, the PLA intervention in the political process can be viewed as the "socialization of political conflict," whereby the politically weak expanded the arena of political conflict and mobilized new participants in order to redress the balance of forces.⁴ In the wake of the collapse of Mao's utopian Great Leap and commune programs in the early 1960's, Mao was opposed and politically eclipsed by other party leaders who controlled the party machinery. To overcome the opposition within the party and to project his will, Mao was compelled to go outside the party organiza-

tions to recruit support from other groups.⁵ Hence, he turned to the PLA, co-opted it, and used it as a power base from which to attack and remove the centers of opposition within the party.

It is true that some PLA leaders played a substantial supporting role in helping Mao defeat such powerful party figures as Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the eleventh Central Committee (CC) plenum in August, 1966, and were instrumental in organizing and providing transport and logistical support for the hordes of Red Guards who journeyed to Peking in the summer and fall of 1966. Yet the extensive involvement of many PLA units in the subsequent "seizure of power" from below by the Maoist rebels was evidently not planned.

What seems most striking about the PLA intervention in Chinese politics, at least during 1965–1967, was that the scope, objective and domain of the intervention was structured largely by civilian leaders, and by Mao in particular.⁶ It was the civilian party leadership headed by Mao that expanded or contracted the political roles of the PLA, in response to political exigencies both before and during the Cultural Revolution (GPCR). It is often forgotten that, in the initial stages of the GPCR, the Maoist leadership placed major reliance on the spontaneous forces of the "revolutionary left" (the Red Guards and the rebels). Mao and his supporters pushed the PLA into the mainstream of GPCR to support the "revolutionary left" in January, 1967, only after this strategy proved unworkable in the face of the strong resistance of conservative power holders in Peking and the provinces. A central directive to that effect was issued on January 23, 1967. By injecting the military

into the GPCR, Mao provided the opening for subsequent military intervention in politics and for the emergence of the PLA as the dominant political force in China.

Mao probably did not foresee these far-reaching consequences; he could not have foreseen them at the outset; the PLA, having been indoctrinated for years with the thought of Mao, not only enjoyed his highest confidence but also seemed to be a reliable political instrument. Indeed, soon after the promulgation of the January 23 central directive, PLA leaders in Heilungkiang, Shansi, Shantung, and Kweichow provinces plus the municipality of Shanghai dutifully aided local Maoists to seize power from existing authorities and to establish revolutionary committees (RC's), the new organs of power. But in most other provinces the response of the PLA leaders to the directive was at best equivocal. In some cases, PLA leaders even intervened, knowingly or unknowingly, against the Maoist groups whom they had been called upon to support.

The most important single factor that elevated the military to political prominence, however, was a series of rebel assaults on provincial authorities in an effort to "seize power from below" (in emulation of the 1871 Paris Commune experience). These assaults paralyzed the party and government machinery in many provinces, and the resultant riots, disorderly demonstrations, and "struggle by force" between rival rebel groups produced public chaos. As the civilian party and government organizations could no longer exercise effective authority, the PLA had to move in to fill the power vacuum; thus, power in many provinces devolved to the local PLA leaders.

From March, 1967, onward, the political situation in numerous provinces approximated a military takeover. The PLA actually supplanted civilian party/government officials and set up military governments in the form of "military control committees" to enforce direct military rule. It also ran agricultural and industrial production, controlled mass media, and operated other essential services.

The Wuhan mutiny of July, 1967, resulted in still further expansion of military sway in Chinese politics.⁷ In retrospect, the incident was a major turning point in the GPCR, for it ultimately compelled Mao to change his tack. The mutiny clearly indicated that at least some military leaders supported anti-Maoist groups in opposition to the radical goals of the GPCR and were even willing to defy the central authorities overtly; it likewise testified to a direct and sharp clash between the PLA and the revolutionary rebels. Although Ch'en Ts'ai-tao, commander of the Wuhan Military Region, and several of his collaborators were ousted after the mutiny was quelled, the broad conflict between the PLA and the rebels continued, and there was a distinct prospect that other similar inci-

⁵ This tactic has been used over and over again by Mao. See Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," *The China Quarterly*, October–December, 1970, especially pp. 173–74; and Richard Baum, "Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress," *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, edited by Robert A. Scalapino (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 550–52.

⁶ I am grateful to Professor Tang Tsou for this point.

⁷ The origins of the mutiny go back to prior months and the actions of Wuhan PLA leaders in support of the local conservative faction against the local "revolutionary" faction. In July, two Peking emissaries—Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih, a member of the Politburo, and Wang Li, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group and Acting Director of the CCP Propaganda Department—arrived in Wuhan to assess the situation. When they admonished the local PLA leaders for suppressing the "revolutionaries," the military officers became enraged, and matters quickly got out of hand. On July 20, members of the "Million Heroes"—a group which Hsieh and Wang had denounced but which Ch'en Ts'ai-tao and Chung Han-hua, commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Wuhan Military Region, had backed—kidnapped and physically abused the two Peking envoys. For a detailed and excellent analysis of the incident and its consequences, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Wuhan Incident—Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion during the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* (London), no. 47, July–September, 1971, pp. 413–38.

dents might occur. Confronted with this situation—and apparently pressured by regional-provincial military leaders who met in Peking in early August, 1967—Mao decided to grant the military a new power. A central directive of September 5, 1967, authorized the PLA to use naked force to quell any disobedience.⁸

The effect of the September 5 directive was to make the PLA the determining political element in the provinces. The military authorities soon took advantage of their enhanced power and tried to crack down on unruly and protesting rebel groups. They sent the Red Guards and rebels back to schools and factories, enforced stern discipline against troublemakers, and dissolved many rebel organizations. Moreover, the PLA had a major hand in the formation of the RC's, the organs of "revolutionary power," in 23 provincial-level administrative units from August, 1967, to September, 1968. The very establishment of a new structure of authority symbolized the completion of the "seizure of power" from the former provincial authorities; hence it not only imposed greater limitations on the rebels' activities but also tended to negate their *raison d'être*.

The leading personnel of the 23 RC's unmistakably mirrored the prevailing political reality. Thus, of the 46 chairmen and first vice-chairmen, 36, or 81 percent, were high-ranking regional or provincial PLA officers.⁹ As of September, 1968, 95, or a little more than 43 percent, of the 220 chairmen and vice-chairmen of China's entire 29 provincial-level RC's were military men, with 20 of them holding the post of chairman. Plainly, most of the 23 RC's set up after the Wuhan incident were the creations of local military leaders.

PLA RECALCITRANCE

Whereas Mao succeeded during 1965–1966 in securing PLA intervention on his side to defeat his opponents (e.g., Liu Shao-chi) within the party, and was largely able to determine the scope and objectives of PLA intervention up to the beginning of 1967, after that date PLA intervention assumed a logic and purpose of its own and became less amenable to political control by the civilian party leaders.

One of the major reasons for this development is political-ideological. Mao's attempts to destroy the

existing power structure and to establish a new structure patterned after the experience of the 1871 Paris Commune through the "seizure of power" from below by the Red Guards and rebels drastically altered the nature of the GPCR. The PLA was (and still is) part of the Establishment, and its leaders apparently viewed those who attacked the system with resentment, if not hostility. When in January, 1969, they were ordered to support the leftists who were trying to destroy the system, most PLA leaders were more inclined to restrain the revolutionaries and to align themselves with local party officials.

Other reasons are structural-organizational. The virtual destruction of civilian party and government authorities after January, 1967, left the system with only one organizational hierarchy capable of exercising effective authority—the PLA—and severely undermined the ability of the party leadership in Peking to control PLA actions. Moreover, Peking's mechanisms of control over the military were impaired by the events of the GPCR. Previously, for instance, civilian party officials headed provincial institutions (except in outlying border regions like Sinkiang and Tibet), and there was a system of separation of powers and checks and balances between civilian party and PLA officials. After January, 1967, however, local PLA commanders of professional political commissars headed the party and government apparatuses in most provinces. In fact, PLA personnel actually comprised the core of the leadership in virtually every province. Furthermore, before the advent of the GPCR in 1966, senior secretaries of the party provincial committees or regional bureaus served concurrently as first political commissars in the provincial military districts or military regions to provide party control over the local PLA, but in most cases after 1967 local PLA commanders or professional political commissars functioned concurrently as senior provincial party secretaries. This interlocking of party, government, and military leadership positions and the concentration of political, military, and financial powers in the same hands greatly enhanced the opportunities for local PLA autonomy and rendered local PLA leaders more intractable and more difficult for the central authorities to control.

Thus, when the 29 provincial-level party committees were reconstituted in August, 1971 (more than two years after the ninth party congress which politically symbolized the return of political normalcy), PLA commanders or professional military political commissars still headed 21 of them; and among the 158 ranking provincial officials (first party secretaries, second secretaries, secretaries and deputy secretaries), 95, or 60 percent of them were PLA men. It seems inconceivable that Peking had willed and imposed such a heavy representation of the military in the provincial party apparatus. The truth of the

⁸ The September 5 directive is translated in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong), no. 4026, September 22, 1967, pp. 1–2. (Hereafter this source will be cited as SCMP). On the same day, Chiang Ch'ing made a speech tactily admitting that her Cultural Revolution Group lieutenants had erred in advancing the slogan of "dragging out the handful of capitalist power-holders in the army," and enjoining the rebels not to raid military headquarters or seize arms from the PLA. See SCMP, no. 4069, November 29, 1967, p. 109.

⁹ Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), vol. 9, no. 1, January, 1969, p. 8.

matter is that the local PLA leaders who were already the nucleus of their provincial power structure had played the primary role in rebuilding the civilian party organizations and, in the process, had entrenched themselves in the hierarchy of the provincial party leadership.

Although the PLA performed non-military (e.g., political) functions in the regime prior to the GPCR, such functions had been assigned to it by the party in the first place and had been carried out under the close supervision of the civilian party leadership. During and after the GPCR, however, various political roles assumed by the PLA have been more decisive and important. Specifically, these roles included intervention in the resolution of political conflict at the top, administration in the form of direct military rule, running of the economy in the provinces, political institution building, and supplanting the civilian party/government officials at the center (the party's CC and the State Council) and especially in the provincial leadership hierarchy, and active participation in the policy-formulation process. Moreover, the PLA played those roles in a drastically different political context: the party organizations (except those within the PLA) had been destroyed, and the new organs of power (the revolutionary committees and, subsequently, the reconstituted party committees) were heavily dominated by military men. Therefore it was extremely difficult for civilian party leaders to exercise any meaningful control and supervision over the actions of the PLA.¹⁰

At the top of the unprecedented political prominence of the PLA was the danger of Bonapartism. Without question, Marshal Lin Piao and his followers had greatly benefited from the events of the Cultural Revolution. Not only had Lin replaced Liu Shao-ch'i as Mao's successor and become the sole vice-chairman of the party, but he had also placed many of his followers in the Fourth Field Army in key positions and had substantially expanded his base of power. For example, Lin promoted a fellow Fourth Army leader, Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the Canton Military Region (MR), to the post of PLA Chief

of Staff in March, 1968, bypassing many equally, if not better, qualified men, including several incumbent deputy chiefs of staff. In addition, Lin sent his wife and his followers from the Fourth Field Army to control the "administrative unit" of the Military Affairs Commission (MAC), the regime's supreme military decision-making body. Moreover, Lin also replaced more than 300 senior military officials at various levels with his own men and made considerable inroads into the power base of other military factions.

When the ninth party congress was convened in April, 1969, Lin's men packed the meeting. He was the featured speaker, delivering the political report to the congress, and the congress adopted a new party constitution containing an unprecedented provision that saluted Lin Piao and sanctioned his succession to Mao (a provision which was allegedly inserted at Lin's behest):

Comrade Lin Piao has consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor.

In the newly elected CC, approximately 46 percent, or 127 of the 279 members, were career soldiers, and in the 25-member Politburo, 13 were military representatives. In these two highest decision-making bodies of the party, Lin's supporters constituted the largest and most influential group. In the post-congress period, the military continued to dominate the party and, under his stewardship, Lin managed to place the army in control of nearly every aspect of life in China, defying the "unified leadership" of the party.

THE PURGE OF LIN PIAO

There seems to be no question that the domination of the PLA over China's political system was the basic cause of the conflict between Mao and Lin Piao and that Mao came to perceive Lin's enhanced position as threatening his own power and leadership. The situation was certainly neither anticipated nor desired by Mao, for it was contrary to his dictum that the party must direct the "gun" and that the "gun" should not be allowed to command the party. Given the increasingly strong position of the military and Lin Piao in China's politics, a suspicious Mao apparently viewed the whole situation with grave apprehension.¹¹ Subsequently, the party's CC met in a plenary session at Lushan in late August to early September, 1970, to consider, among other things, a draft of the new state constitution. Lin Piao spoke in favor of retaining the post of head of state (to which Lin may have aspired), in disagreement with Mao, who wanted to abolish the post. This strengthened Mao's distrust of Lin, and Mao apparently made a decision shortly thereafter to curtail Lin Piao's power and to

¹⁰ Prior to the downfall of Lin Piao in the fall of 1971, the reconstituted party committees in the provinces were unable to exercise "unified leadership" over local PLA authorities, and the decisions they made had to be "reviewed" by the PLA leaders. Mao was quoted to have complained: "Local party committees had already been established, and they should have exercised unified leadership. Wasn't it just upside down if matters already decided upon by local party committees were still taken to army party committees for discussion?" "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local Comrades during His Tour of Inspection" (Mid-August to September 12, 1971), translated in *Chinese Law and Government*, vol. 5, nos. 3-4, Fall/Winter, 1972-1973, p. 40.

¹¹ For an excellent analysis of the causes of the Mao-Lin conflict and its development, see Ying-mao Kau, "Editor's Introduction," *ibid.*, pp. 3-30.

reassert the party's control over the military.

In December, 1970, Mao called an enlarged Politburo session at Pei-tai-ho and subjected Lin Piao and his five top aides, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, Yeh Ch'un, and Ch'iu Hui-tso, to severe criticism. Following the meeting, at the end of January, 1971, Mao reshuffled the commanding officers of the Peking Military Region and the Peking Garrison, replaced Lin Piao's men there, and transferred troop units considered loyal to Lin out of the Peking area.

In fact, these maneuvers have been detailed vividly in a secret party document numbered "*Chung-fa* 1972 (12)." In Mao's own words, he adopted three measures after the Lushan conference:

One was to throw stones, one was to mix in sand, and the third was to dig up the cornerstone. I criticized the material Ch'en Po-ta had used to deceive many people, and I commented on reports of the Thirty-Eighth Army and of the Tsinan Military District on opposing arrogance and complacency. I also made critical comments on a document of the long forum of the Military Affairs Commission, which didn't criticize Ch'en at all. My method was to get hold of these stones and make critical comments, and then let everyone discuss them—this was throwing stones. When dirt is too tightly packed, no air can get through; but if a little sand is mixed in, air can circulate. Not enough people had been mixed into the "Administrative Unit" of the Military Affairs Commission, so I added a few more men—this is called mixing in sand. Reorganizing the Peking Military Region is called digging up the cornerstone.¹²

The implications of Mao's moves were not lost on Lin Piao and his top aides. And soon thereafter, according to another secret CCP document "*Chung-fa* 1972 (4)," Lin Piao and his cohorts went into action to prepare a coup against Mao to which they gave a code name "571 Project."¹³ After the coup was foiled, according to the story released by Peking, Lin, his wife, and his son were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia on September 13, 1971, while they were attempting to flee from China.

Amid efforts to expose and repudiate Lin's crimes, the Chinese leadership has also renewed an intensive nationwide campaign to curtail the political roles of the PLA and to reassert party control over all spheres of Chinese life. The arrogance and complacency of PLA men and their tendency as leaders in various party and government organizations to ignore the principle of democratic centralism and to rule by fiat have been singled out for attack, and the role of the PLA cadres has been subjected to mounting criticism and close scrutiny by their civilian colleagues.

In the wake of Lin's demise, scores of ranking PLA

officials, most if not all of them presumably Lin's followers or otherwise implicated in the Lin Piao affair, were removed. Among these victims were the heads of the PLA central command and service arms (e.g., Huang Yung-sheng, PLA Chief of Staff, Chiu Hui-tso, commander of the general logistics department, Wu Fa-hsien, commander of the Air Force, and Li Tso-p'eng, first political commissar of the Navy), as well as senior provincial leaders who concurrently held top posts in local military headquarters (e.g., Liang Hsin-chu, commander of the Chengtu MR, and Lung Shu-chin, commander of the Sinkiang MR).

Furthermore, when the party held its tenth national congress in August, 1973, the PLA representation in the party's top decision-making bodies was reduced. In the 25-member (21 regular and 4 alternate) Politburo, for example, the PLA representatives have dropped from 13 (elected during the ninth congress in 1969) to 7, as Lin Piao and his aides have been eliminated. In the new Central Committee (CC), out of a total of 319 (195 full and 124 alternate) members, 100 (63 full and 37 alternate) members, or 31.3 percent, are military figures, whereas in the ninth CC there were 127, or 45.6 percent, out of 279 members.

The drive to cut back the political roles of the PLA and to tighten party control over the PLA leaders culminated in a dramatic wholesale transfer of virtually all top regional PLA leaders in December, 1973. As a result of this major shift, the central party leadership moved regional PLA leaders from their long entrenched bases of power, which Peking came to see as intractable "independent kingdoms."

Moreover, through the transfer, Peking also relieved the regional PLA leaders of the top provincial party and government posts they used to hold concurrently, and filled them with civilians. There are still a few provinces in which commanders of the provincial military districts still concurrently head the provincial party committees; in time, the commanders are likely to be relieved of their top party and government posts.

The dramatic developments of December, 1973, demonstrated the determination of the party leadership to bring the regional PLA leaders and the PLA as a whole under "unified party leadership." The

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¹² The text of the document is translated into English in *ibid.*, pp. 31-42. The quoted passage is based on *ibid.*, p. 38, with minor corrections in translation.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-57.

"Though it is too early to be certain, events of the past four years may constitute a threshold in China's relations with the third world." Third world nations "are responsive to the example of a self-reliant China and inspired by China's courage in confronting the world's great nuclear powers."

China and the Third World

BY PETER VAN NESS

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THE HIGHEST RANKING official of the People's Republic of China ever to visit the United States, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, came to New York in April, 1974, to explain Chinese views on the relationship between the world's poor nations ("underdeveloped") and the world's rich ("developed") to a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on raw materials and development. The special session had been requested by Algerian President Houari Boumedienne in January, against a background of the Arab oil embargo and skyrocketing world petroleum prices, drought and starvation in central Africa, American efforts to unify the industrialized major oil-consuming nations against the oil-producers' cartel, and a general world economic situation characterized by a disastrously widening gap between the world's poorest countries and the rich. The special session of the General Assembly, its first devoted to economic questions, had been called at the initiative of the developing countries in the hope of establishing a "new international economic order." Writing in *The New York Times*, James Reston described the special session as an impeachment trial of a civilization, with the deprived peoples of the world drawing up articles of impeachment against the rich.¹

When his opportunity came to address the session, Vice Premier Teng chose "imperialist exploitation" as his theme, and related it directly to the central concerns that had motivated the session. The Chinese statement² enthusiastically endorsed the Arabs' use of oil as a political weapon during the Arab-Israeli war, hailing it as a "pioneering action," and proposed that "what was done in the oil battle should, and can be done, in the case of other raw materials."

What was new in Teng Hsiao-p'ing's speech was an explicit confirmation of an evolving Chinese analysis of the principal groupings of states and the main lines of cleavage in world politics. Teng's interpretation of the present international situation and his prescriptions for actions followed. "The whole world is in turbulence and unrest," he argued. "The situation is one of 'great disorder under heaven' as we Chinese put it." Basic contradictions in the world were sharpening, causing a disintegration of the old established international order and an "awakening and growth of the new emerging forces of the people." Under assault was a world dominated by the two superpowers ("the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today"). The future belonged to the people of the developing countries ("They constitute a revolutionary motive force combating colonialism, imperialism, and particularly the superpowers"). The United States and the Soviet Union no longer represented political and philosophical alternatives (capitalism versus communism or "the free world" versus "the socialist camp"). Because of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the appearance of Soviet "social-imperialism," the superpowers had become essentially alike, imperialist world powers competing with each other to establish hegemony over the rest of the world. As a result, Teng announced, even the socialist camp "is no longer in existence."

What, then, did the world look like, according to the Chinese? Vice Premier Teng answered succinctly, if simplistically:

Judging from the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the first world. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and other regions make up the third world. The developed countries between the two make up the second world. . . .

China is a socialist country, and a developing country

¹ *The New York Times*, April 24, 1974, p. 37.

² All quotations are from the official English language translation published as a supplement to *Peking Review*, April 12, 1974.

as well, China belongs to the third world. . . . China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one.³

One problem with the Chinese three-world formulation is the decision as to which countries should comprise the third world. This is not just a problem with the Chinese categorization. Usage of the term third world is almost universally ambiguous, and the ambiguities disguise issues of substantial political significance, particularly with regard to the feasibility of the political coalitions that the Chinese and others have been suggesting among third world countries. The question, then, remains: what in the world is the third world?

There are at least five separate criteria that have been used by analysts to identify countries of the so-called third world: economic (poor or "underdeveloped"), cultural (non-Western), racial (non-white), political (nonaligned), and geographical (situated in Asia, Africa, or Latin America). Examples of the difficulty in fitting individual countries to the different criteria illustrate the problem. For instance, several of the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East (the very states suggested as examples for the third world by Teng Hsiao-p'ing) have achieved some of the highest levels of per capita GNP in the world, and therefore would be excluded from a definition based on an economic deprivation criterion. Many South American countries (at least their elites) are both Western and white, and thus are not eligible for inclusion in terms of cultural and racial criteria. Further, if political nonalignment were interpreted to require the exclusion of all countries that were signatories to defense pacts with any major world power, several African and Asian countries as well as most Latin American countries (and, technically, even China because of the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950) would be excluded. Clearly, the geographical criterion is the most inclusive of all. But how many analysts would agree that the Soviet Union, Japan, Israel, Rhodesia, and South Africa should thereby qualify as part of the third world?

The Chinese definition of third world as implied in Teng's speech is apparently flexible, unconstrained by the criteria that I have suggested. However, the Chinese concept may be closely in accord with the original term, *tiers monde*, coined by the French in the

mid-1950's.⁴ The French term, which apparently originated after the first conference of Afro-Asian states at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, emphasized a third force or a grouping of states between, and distinctively apart from, the two major alliances of that time, the West and the socialist camp. The Chinese concept of a third world similarly envisages a grouping of states opposed to the two major world power centers—in this case, the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The third world, for the Chinese then, would seem to be very broadly defined as the non-industrialized countries of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, Communist and non-Communist alike. Potentially, this group constitutes the vast majority of the world's independent states and population—if not its wealth and present military capabilities. The third world in this sense could be a third force politically, no longer with respect to two alliances (the West and the socialist camp) but rather with regard to the United States and the Soviet Union. Presumably, even the closest allies of the superpowers might be courted for membership in the new coalition. As Teng Hsiao-p'ing argued, there are significant disagreements between the superpowers and their most durable post-World War II allies in the industrialized countries of the so-called "second world."

Although in some respects it is superficial, the Chinese three-world concept represents a policy position appropriate to many political issues that are of great concern to the developing countries. The concept also seeks to identify China with third world aspirations, and to build coalitions among third world countries capable of sharply altering existing patterns of international relations, economic and political. In contrast to earlier Chinese emphasis on revolution in the third world,⁵ Teng Hsiao-p'ing gives precedence to cultivating relations with the governments of the non-Communist independent states.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Foreign policy-makers of any state must first and foremost be concerned with the problem of national security. Neighboring countries, especially those enjoying military capabilities sufficient to inflict major damage, have usually received special attention. In this regard, the People's Republic of China has followed the pattern.

The People's Republic is bordered by eleven third world countries and one superpower. Beginning in the north and moving clockwise around China's borders, those countries are: Mongolia, North Korea, Republic of China (Taiwan),⁶ North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. If we define "neighboring state" as a state located within 500 miles of the nearest border, then six more third world countries, plus

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Paul Robert, *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la Langue Française* (Paris: 1969), s.v. "tiers monde."

⁵ Probably the best-known statement of the earlier policies is that of Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965.

⁶ The Republic of China is considered a bordering country in that it occupies several islands just off the coast of the Chinese mainland. The British colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese colony of Macao also border China, but they are not included here because they are not independent states.

Japan, qualify as China's neighbors: South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Bangladesh.

China is most concerned about these third world countries. Yet, in the 25 years since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, none of her neighbors, except the Soviet Union, has constituted a significant threat, *in terms of its own capabilities*, to the national security of China. Obviously, several third world neighbors have contributed to *local* Chinese security problems, especially in Tibet and in the southern Chinese provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. For example, Kuomintang attempts at subversion and sporadic commando raids from Taiwan have presumably harassed some regional Chinese authorities, but in spite of Taiwan's President Chiang Kai-shek's promise to return to the mainland, there has been little likelihood that Taiwan would attempt to do so on her own. India and China finally came to blows over their Himalayan border dispute in 1962, but even then it was clear that India had no intention of challenging the overall authority of the People's Republic.

The possible exception to the rule may have occurred shortly prior to the border conflict, in 1962. After three difficult years in China, the Chinese leadership was apparently fearful that Taiwan and India might coordinate their military plans to take advantage of China's domestic weaknesses.⁷ But even then, Chinese anxieties probably focused on the role of the United States in such an eventuality, rather than on whether the People's Liberation Army was capable of fighting off India and Taiwan simultaneously if they attacked without United States aid.

Real threats to Chinese national security since 1949 have come almost exclusively from the superpowers or from their military involvement in conflicts in neighboring third world countries. The first threat came from the United States in the period from the Korean War to the beginning of Sino-American détente in 1971; later, the threat came from the Soviet Union, from perhaps as early as 1964, when Soviet Premier

Nikita Khrushchev is believed to have given serious thought to an attack against China's budding nuclear capability, up to the present. No other state has had the capability or the will to consider engaging China's army in sustained conflict. In fact, even the superpowers have thus far stopped short of initiating direct life-or-death struggles with the People's Republic.

Nonetheless, conflicts involving the superpowers and Chinese national security have raged in several neighboring third world countries during the 25 years of the People's Republic. With the exception of conflicts arising out of legitimate territorial disputes,⁸ the Chinese apparently thought national security was sufficiently endangered to require intervention with Chinese military units only when the superpowers were directly involved. There were two cases, both involving offensive military action by American military forces. During the Korean War, in the autumn of 1950, the United States, in spite of repeated Chinese warnings, decided to cross the 38th parallel, which had served as the border between North and South Korea, in an effort to roll back communism in North Korea. China sent troops to aid North Korea. During the Vietnam War, in the period from 1965 to 1968, in the face of escalating American intervention in the South and air attacks on the North, China sent as many as 50,000 troops to North Vietnam to serve as a deterrent to further American escalation and to assist in the air defense and reconstruction of communications lines in the North.⁹ In both cases, Chinese troops were withdrawn when the American military activities ceased.

This analysis may appear to overstate the Chinese motivation with respect to their involvement in regional military conflicts, especially today, when we tend, incorrectly, to think of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States as major world powers on a roughly equal footing. In truth, the Chinese nuclear weapons-missile capability is minuscule compared to that of either the United States or the Soviet Union, and in spite of its fairly rapid development in recent years, it still does not constitute an adequate deterrent vis-à-vis either superpower.

While recent developments in Chinese missile and nuclear weapons' technology have gradually begun to alter the strategic imbalance, the superpowers' military relationships with China's third world neighbors continue to cause concern. Although the American "containment" policy is on the wane, Soviet sponsorship of "collective security in Asia" along similar anti-Chinese lines appears to be a persistent Soviet aim.

As an illustration, let us look again at the 17 third world countries which are "neighbors" of China.¹⁰ During the period from 1950 to 1971, when the United States posed a direct threat to Chinese national security, 10 of China's 17 third world neighbors¹¹ were American military allies; i.e., they were

⁷ See, Allen Whiting's excellent book on the India-China border war and the Chinese use of force in international relations, forthcoming from the University of Michigan Press.

⁸ Aside from border conflicts with the Soviet Union, these disputes have principally been the India-China border war and the brief battle in the winter of 1973-1974 with the South Vietnamese government over the ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (see *The New York Times*, January 21, 1974, p. 2, and February 6, 1974, p. 3).

⁹ Whiting, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Sources for the evidence presented in this analysis are: *The Military Balance 1973-1974* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973) and *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1971).

¹¹ Republic of China, Laos, Burma, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Philippines, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand.

either signatories to defense pacts or military base agreements with the United States, or recipients of American military aid. Utilizing the same definition of military ally, in the period of hostility between China and the Soviet Union, from 1964 to the present, a different group of 10 of the same neighboring third world countries¹² had military relationships with the Soviet Union. In sum, every one of China's third world neighbors (except tiny Bhutan, for which I cannot find information) was a military ally of one or the other superpower during a period of persistent hostility toward China.¹³ To the Chinese, efforts to encircle the People's Republic with military bases or alliances in neighboring third world countries must appear to be a superpower characteristic.

An obvious alternative explanation of such an array of superpower military relationships around the periphery of China could be that the People's Republic had provoked them, i.e., that China was indeed as aggressive and expansionist as the cold war and "yellow peril" myths described her. The facts tell a different story. It is true that China has not been passive regarding the countries beyond her borders, and doubtless many Asian states have harbored fears of their giant neighbor. But what has China actually done? We have referred to the two major wars which China has fought with neighboring third world countries (the border war with India, and the Korean War). In both cases, the conflicts were concluded on the basis of a withdrawal of Chinese troops; they resulted in no new territory or political control for Peking. Also, in addition to periodically exchanging artillery fire along China's coast with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the continuing civil war, the People's Republic of China has supported Communist revolutions at one time or another against the estab-

lished governments of 7 of its 17 third world neighbors.¹⁴ This support has been largely verbal, but some substantial training and material assistance has been given as well. However, at no time has Chinese assistance constituted more than a modest fraction of American aid to the other side; and, more important, in contrast to the direct intervention of American military forces in several of these conflicts (up to 500,000 men in Vietnam alone), Chinese military units have never been known to have engaged in combat on behalf of Communist revolutionary movements outside China's borders.¹⁵ Moreover, given the tremendous imbalance in military capabilities between China and the superpowers, it is difficult to conceive of China provoking either one of them to military combat, unless one assumes that the Chinese are fundamentally irrational.¹⁶

Without doubt, the most important recent turning point in Chinese international relations was the beginning of a normalization of relations with the United States in 1971. The decision of the United States and China to reverse their attitudes of mutual hostility and actively to seek areas of cooperation has had an impact on the entire international system.

Most analysts would agree that the principal factor motivating China to seek détente with the United States was the Soviet threat to China. The American military threat to China seemed to have been receding, as the domestic opposition to a continued American involvement in the Indochina conflict plus deepening problems at home forecast a declining United States military role in Asia. Moreover, internationally, pressure was building against American military intervention in Indochina and United States cold war policies toward the People's Republic.

The Nixon administration, for its part, was anxious to insure a reelection victory in November, 1972, and, in this regard, some means of concluding an agreement in Vietnam had to be found. The opening to China was seen by the administration as potentially popular in itself, and also as a way to establish an acceptable basis for an American withdrawal from Vietnam if China could help facilitate an agreement that the Nixon administration could accept.¹⁷ An additional benefit for the United States would be the leverage that it would gain on the Soviet Union in the triangular relationship among the three powers. Playing "barbarians" against one another—long thought to be an important characteristic of tradi-

(Continued on page 133)

¹² Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Laos, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Bangladesh. Although Soviet military assistance to all these countries has by no means always been directed against China, certainly Soviet military relations with some of them have been: e.g., Mongolia (on China's northern border) and India (on Peking's vulnerable southwestern flank).

¹³ Four countries had military relationships with both superpowers: Laos, India, Pakistan, and Cambodia.

¹⁴ Burma, Cambodia, India, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Arms Trade with the Third World* (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 361.

¹⁵ There are confirmed reports that Chinese troops are helping to build roads in the Pathet Lao-held areas of northern Laos. These forces have defended themselves with anti-aircraft artillery when attacked by hostile airplanes, but they have not engaged in offensive military action in support of the Laotian revolutionaries.

¹⁶ Regarding the Chinese use of force in international relations, see Whiting, *op. cit.*, and Peter Van Ness, "Is China an Expansionist Power?" in Frank B. Horton III, *et al.* (eds.), *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 523-529.

¹⁷ See Tad Szulc, "Vietnam: The Secret Record," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1974, p. C1.

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"Mao has demonstrated that it is possible to run a big but not very complex economy without economics and economists. He has also shown that it is feasible to conduct the business of society by relying on a network of political cadres, an implanted ethic of service to the community, fear, pride of achievement, pragmatism, and some common sense."

China's Political Economy: A Traveler's Report

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

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THIS IS A REPORT on some of the things that struck me most during a three-week visit to the People's Republic of China in February, 1974: Since I am an economist with a special interest in centrally planned systems, the report will focus on China's economy, but I shall interpret the focus generously to include chunks of politics, culture, and social mores.

Our itinerary covered Canton, Shanghai, Soochow, Wuhsi, Nanking, and Peking with side trips into the countryside. Universities, schools, factories, communes, theaters, historical monuments and so on were visited, and there were opportunities to wander outside the edifying but restrictive walls of our schedule. It is not unusual, on their return, for visitors to China to apologize for the brevity of the trip, the small and not always typical sample of the society observed, and their lack of expertise, and then to proceed to pontificate on contemporary China. I make no apologies. Even a short trip and a small sample can be instructive provided one goes there prepared.

The visit occurred at the time of the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao campaign, in other words, during a relatively tense period. The tenseness was especially noticeable in Shanghai, which seems to have been, if not the originator, certainly the center of the churning. Such campaigns have a tendency to veer against foreigners. In fact, while we were winding our way through China, diplomatic personnel in Peking apparently found it hard to procure from Chinese authorities travel permits for such places as Shanghai, Nanking, and Tientsin.

Our Pennsylvania State University group experienced no difficulties; we were received courteously. Our hosts went out of their way to accede to our many requests, although they reserved the right to judge which requests were unreasonable or "inconvenient." (One such inconvenient request was to visit with the

Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Central Planning Commission. Another was to see the main Peking University library and departmental collections in most universities. We were not allowed to ride on the Peking subway, which—as I understand it—is part of the capital's very extensive system of bomb shelters and tunnels.) Except for a ban on photographing big character posters—a prohibition that was fairly inoperative given the number of posters in such cities as Shanghai and Soochow—a few industrial construction sites, oil unloading facilities, bomb shelter construction, and abandoned churches, we were given wide latitude to take pictures, wider than in the U.S.S.R.

Here again, however, there was an implied request by our hosts not to photograph the poverty of China. They preferred that we record new China's industrial and other achievements. The campaign against Antonioni's allegedly biased and distorted documentary film on China was then in full swing. Thus, although formal restrictions on the use of the camera were few, informal pressure not to photograph "inconvenient" scenes was persuasive. Chinese customs regulations require that all film taken out of China be developed. The rule is hardly ever applied. Once in possession of a visa, the frontier formalities are just formalities. Compared with the thinly disguised rudeness with which arrivals in the United States are met as a matter of general principle, the Chinese border confrontation is a gentlemanly affair—for those with a valid passport and visa.

Our three permanent interpreters and many local interpreters were pleasant companions and efficient, discreetly solicitous guardians. Most of them had a good command of English, an enormous appetite for improving it, impeccable manners tempered by an underlying toughness, and the most marginal curiosity about the external world. For all their ready smiles, helpfulness, and engaging fellowship, never once—to

my knowledge—did they lower their guard. They were perfectly programmed and attuned to the latest editorial in the *People's Daily* and the last cadre briefing. I shall not soon forget the guide who met me at one of the higher elevations on the Great Wall, to which I had puffed my way through brutal wind in -30°F temperatures. There she was, without a hat, with only a light scarf wrapped around her head, saying: "You are a hero!" A quotation from Chairman Mao."

Two in our group spoke Chinese, and through them we had occasional access to the "masses." From all contacts, official or unofficial, I derived respect and admiration for a very civilized, proud, and delightful people. As one moves through this well-tended land, one is impressed by the inventiveness, ingeniousness, and self-confidence of the Chinese. Through an accident of history, they have fallen behind much of the world in technology: but they have lots to offer as a counterbalance to the trinkets-and-tinsel life that has been built in other parts of the world. There is also much in China that is frightening to anyone educated in an individualist philosophy. Refined charm is just a scratch away from moodiness, cruelty, and violence. I found some aspects of China appalling, especially in the realms of human engineering and the canned culture that Chiang Ching and her cohorts are imposing.

There are many contradictions in China today, as there have always been. In reporting on aspects of Chinese reality as it filters down through one's preconceptions, prejudices, and culture-bound perceptions, one is bound to displease almost every audience. It is a worthwhile risk. My impressions fall neatly into two parts: the physical and the moral economy.

First of all, there is the land. Of all the physical problems in China, the work that has been done and continues to be done on the land is the most revolutionary. Everyone has read newspaper reports on the annual water conservation campaigns, which on occasion, as during the Great Leap Forward of 1958, take on gigantic proportions and move at a furious pace. Most of the time the tempo is much more relaxed, almost lackadaisical.¹ People work steadily but with-

out haste: there is none of the ant-heap effect one sometimes hears about. But the dimensions of the water conservation and land melioration movement are monumental, far bigger than most Westerners imagine. By the joint effort of millions of hands, with simple tools and little mechanical power, the physical profile of China is being relentlessly remade. The battle against the mean side of nature—the twin threats of drought and floods—has been engaged and, I think, is being won by determination, will power, and persistence, coupled with common-sense planning and coordination. Ever since the imaginative and, as it turned out, imaginary statistical claims of 1958 and 1959, the Chinese reputation for truth in economic reporting has not been good. But given the amount of melioration work that has been done on the land, I would be inclined to accept Chinese figures regarding agricultural output and productivity, if the data are released during relative domestic political calm.

Then there are those small rural industries (workshops would be a better term) everywhere. They keep people busy during the slack season and furnish a variety of simple agricultural producer and consumer goods for the local populations. They are, in a sense, the successors of cottage handicraft industries, except that they do turn out pumps, generators, threshers, and small walking tractors, chemical fertilizer, and cement—even handmade trucks. The development of these labor-intensive rural industries using traditional technology plus some up-to-date know-how is a distinctive feature of Maoist socialism. It helps make it possible to keep the labor force on the land, tailoring migration to the cities to whatever employment openings are available because of urban industrial investment.

China is perhaps the only country in the world in which the early stages of the industrial revolution are not accompanied by massive country-to-city migrations. Allocation of manpower is by administrative order only. There is no free movement of labor. In fact, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, a concerted attempt has been made to transfer large numbers of young educated people (mainly junior high school graduates) to the countryside. Many of these youngsters are settled in the more inhospitable border regions of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. They have little if any voice in the matter. When you talk to them they explain that they go where the state tells them to go in order to serve the people. Before his fall, Lin Piao was quoted as saying that this policy was a form of disguised forced labor. Since everyone who lives in a city is there because his presence has been sanctioned by the existence of a job and housing, the urban social problems associated with industrialization—including crime—are kept to a minimum, although they have by no means disappeared.²

¹ The relaxed pace, which I observed almost everywhere, may be in part symptomatic of underemployment.

² One can easily be silly on this question of crime elimination. Any totalitarian regime can, if it chooses, get rid of pimps, prostitutes, and other scars on the social physiognomy. Benito Mussolini did this in Italy; Adolf Hitler did it in Germany. Progressive travelers would come back from these countries and relate what a truly wonderful job had been done. I am not suggesting that the methods used by the Chinese Communists were the same. "Re-education" played an important part, and the removal of the symptoms was accompanied by an attack on the social and material causes of the illness. But the Chinese methods could not conceivably be employed in a democracy. Those very people who extoll the observed rarity of crime in China would be the first to recoil in horror. Incidentally, the trains run remarkably on time in China, too.

Hotel rooms in Canton are not locked, but bicycles are. An effort is being made to decongest the larger urban centers by establishing self-contained satellite cities on the rim of the old inner towns.

Communist regimes expend a good deal of energy and wealth on urban planning and beautification only to establish drab and listless cities. China is no exception. Compared with bustling, neighboring Hong Kong, Canton is subdued. There is the uniformity of dress, the unisex baggy look of the people who pack the streets. There is the absence of cars and the continual procession of bicycles. Building maintenance leaves much to be desired. The invisible but heavy hand of bureaucracy stifles initiative—perhaps less so in China than elsewhere in the socialist world. Unlike other Communist regimes, the Chinese government has tolerated the survival of a joint state-private basis of many small retail stores, repair shops, service establishments, and so on, side by side with large department stores. Compared to other Communist countries, this livens up the scene, but it does not give the cities the animated look that is associated with Tokyo, Singapore, or Hong Kong. On the other hand, in China uniformed armed guards are not positioned outside jewelry stores. In Peking, I saw hundreds of watches—some of them very expensive foreign makes—displayed under glass counters in a large department store. Crowds were milling around the display cases, admiring the merchandise. There was one diminutive-looking sales clerk in attendance. Watches, incidentally, seem to be the only item of “jewelry” available for purchase by Chinese consumers. In any event, the cities of China do not have the cancerous look of the typical American inner city.

What is striking in China compared to other Communist countries—many of them more developed—is the relative profusion of manufactured consumer goods and all kinds of processed and unprocessed foods. Relative to wages, the goods (not the food) are expensive. A bicycle costs anywhere between 120 and 170 yuan (\$60–\$85 at the current exchange rate); a sewing machine can run up to 250 yuan; a radio set, 80 yuan; a small-screen portable TV, between 300 and 400 yuan. That is big money. The average wage of an industrial worker is about 50 yuan (\$25) a month. Peasants earn much less. But there is a good deal of actual buying. I used to read stereotyped phrases in the *Peking Review* about the “liveliness of commerce.” What I saw of the commerce in the cities I visited was lively enough. Food is cheap and plentiful. Fruit and vegetables are in ample supply, and (in contrast to Russia) most of the food looks edible. Grain, vegetable oil, and soy sauce are ra-

tioned. The individual monthly allocation is about as much as anyone would want to eat. The price of a pound of rice is about U.S.\$0.07, but you can get a cheaper variety. Potatoes cost U.S.\$0.03 a pound. Pork is expensive: about U.S.\$0.50 a pound for the better grade. Food stocks appear adequate. Stockpiling takes place at all levels, from the central state right down to the household.

I saw a great deal of digging everywhere. The Chinese are building bomb shelters and grain storage facilities as a precaution against a Soviet nuclear attack. The subject of Soviet aggressive intentions is constantly being raised by the people one meets. The thesis that the Soviets have ceased to be socialists and have turned into social-imperialists (a species worse, I gather, than capitalist imperialists) is repeated everywhere. Americans are warned against Soviet duplicity. There are, of course, excellent historical reasons for the Chinese to feel the way they do about the fraternal power next door. But over and above all, this is the current official line; so everybody parrots it. If, in line with the dialectical principle, the Chairman changes his mind tomorrow, the nation will reverse itself too. What the Chairman wants, the Chairman gets.

In the meantime, with all that burrowing, another—underground—China is surely coming into being. Newspaper columnist C. L. Sulzberger thinks that some of that subterranean China may even be under Soviet territory.³ Even if the Soviet attack never comes, at least the Chinese will have carried out the world's greatest geological prospecting operation.

Because people eat three modest but adequate meals a day and because medical help and advice are free and available, the people look healthy enough. Many older women hobble on their deformed feet, a legacy of binding, but there are no visible signs of the nutritional or other diseases so common in the developing world. Next to the revolution in land tending, the revolution in public health is the most striking and impressive. The towns and villages I saw were clean. From a very early age, children are taught the importance of personal and social hygiene. The emphasis is on prevention. The so-called “patriotic health campaign” has been waged without interruption since 1949. Venereal diseases, we were told, have been wiped out.

The initial result of public health measures was a sharp drop in infant mortality and an increase in the rate of population increase. Over the years, the regime's attitude toward population control has varied. Nowadays the stress is on family planning, mainly through the postponement of marriage. Peer group pressure is exerted on young couples to limit their families to one child. “Barefoot doctors” and other paramedics dispense birth control information and

³ C. L. Sulzberger, *The Coldest War: The Russian Game in China* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 90.

contraceptives in the countryside. It is not clear how effective the family limitation campaign is, especially in the country. Our repeated inquiries about birth, mortality, and natural increase rates remained unanswered. In response to a question about divorce, a high Kiangsu official (a woman) said: "There are very few divorces in China. Why should there be divorces, now that people marry of their own free will?"

A Soviet dress was once described as a sack with a string tied around it. A Chinese dress has no string. It is, of course, easy to decry the dreary uniformity of apparel in China today. It can just as reasonably be noted that, whatever the look, everyone is clothed, a goal few developing countries have achieved. The masses in Shanghai are better clothed than the masses in Calcutta, and the comparison should be made with Calcutta, not Paris or New York or even Moscow. At the same time, it cannot be denied that clothing in China—like everything else—carries a political message. Like boots, brown or black shirts, epaulettes, or fatigues, which elsewhere symbolize a particular official orthodoxy, the Mao tunic, cap and baggy pants, in two basic colors for men and women, are symbolic of egalitarianism, the glorification of the masses, and the dissolution of the individual. There are many tasteful and beautifully colored fabrics in the stores, and I have seen women buy them. But, except for the clothing of small children, color and distinctiveness in clothing are visibly missing; since the Cultural Revolution they are regarded as manifestations of obnoxious personal vanity. Still, the cadres wear uniforms of better quality than the rank-and-file masses. Cotton fabrics are rationed, and the allotment is adequate, which means that one can squeeze two tunic-and-pants suits out of the ration every year. Ready-made apparel prices reveal a rather wide range. Compared with monthly earnings, clothing is relatively expensive, except for bast or plastic shoes.

Housing is very poor and crowded. Nonetheless, in China no one sleeps on the sidewalk; everyone has a roof over his head. But the roof is shared with perhaps as many as ten other people in an area that, according to minimum standards of housing, should contain not more than four people.

THE MORAL ECONOMY

All economies are political, but some are more political than others, and the Chinese is the most political economy of them all. The politics of the economy is an outgrowth of ethics, the basic outlines of which are set out in the little book of the Chairman's quotations and in the "Five Constantly Read Articles." The system is intensely normative, pervaded by an almost fundamentalist fervor. Every act is either correct or incorrect, and there is no purely positive economic phenomenon. One has the feeling

of being thrown into an isolated temple community, oozing with self-righteousness. Now, obviously, it is very difficult to say how deeply this philosophy goes, and what actually happens below the surface of inspirational maxims. If the philosophy is not accepted, then the Chinese Communists have managed to pull off the greatest illusion act in the world. I doubt that this is the case. Even if people do not quite believe or mean what they say, they still act as if they believe, and peer group pressure plus the security people take care of the deviant. The official guardians of mass morality are the first to acknowledge that the task of keeping the masses on the straight and narrow is never ending. Mass morality is constantly challenged by dark forces of the left and the right, and it has to reinvigorate itself in an unending succession of big and small cultural revolutions.

In an effort to produce a great *Gleichschaltung* of thought and feeling, the uniformity of dress is matched, indeed outstripped, by an uncanny intellectual monotony. Yet there is dissonance. Nanking was clearly dragging its feet on the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao campaign. Although in Shanghai, Soochow, and Wuhsi one could hardly see the buildings for the posters, in near-by Nanking there was next to nothing in the way of posters. While the whole nation wallows in the ritual of denouncing Lin Piao, a taxi driver tells you he does not believe the accusations leveled against Lin. The cultural fare is uniform, and it is meager. Geneva at the apogee of Calvinist fervor was Sodom and Gomorrah compared with Peking and Shanghai today. Except for a few operas and ballets on contemporary revolutionary themes and one or two movies on the same general subject, there is no entertainment for the masses. The choreography is all right, although it lacks color. The government attempts to create a proletarian cultural content and style. Unfolding before our eyes are six or seven morality plays with local adaptations: art carrying the message of self-abnegation, service to the people, selflessness, and total devotion to the Chairman's thought. The result may look a little simplistic—to some Chinese and to foreigners alike. There is a dialectical, head-on confrontation of right and wrong, the right always triumphant in the end. Compared to the richly costumed and styled Peking opera and other forms of Chinese artistic expression, the new culture is narrow, drab, simplistic, and inspirational. Like the loudspeakers blarring out the correct line, it allows no escape from everyday reality. At least part of the leadership—a powerful left faction—regards the new culture as indispensable to economic construction, interpreted to mean the building of a new socialist man.

Cultural life in China today is the result of a drive that goes back at least as far as the Socialist Education Campaign of the early 1960's, but in fact it has its roots in the guerrilla ethos of Yen-an. It was finally

inaugurated with the Cultural Revolution. As long as Mao is alive and in charge, any conflict between revolutionary purity and the growth of output will be decided in favor of revolutionary purity. An important component of this purity is an abhorrence of bureaucratic privilege, a clear preference for classlessness with an unostentatious pecking order.

I have the impression (and that is all it is) that over and above and beyond the struggle to feed, clothe, and house 800 million people whose ranks swell by 15 million every year, contemporary China is engaged in a monumental experiment in the transformation of man. Such an experiment is not new. What are new are the scale, thoroughness, and determination involved. The accepted mainsprings of economic incentive (accepted even by the Soviets) are questioned in China: the desire materially to better oneself and one's kin, and to escape manual toil by means of merit, education, influence, or whatever other means are at hand. The very concept of the person as a legitimate, autonomous and social micro-unit is questioned. Social reality begins not with man but with groups of men unrelated by blood. The legitimacy of the individual is established by his success in blending with the mass according to recipes laid down in the commandments. This does not mean that people do not try to beat the system, or that the philosophy of selflessness is joyfully shared by everyone. There is surely much dissension and bottled-up resentment. Career objectives have been stifled, and hopes have been dashed—very much so since the Cultural Revolution. But as of now the lid is on. The approved aspiration of an educated young man or woman is to become a peasant or a factory worker—preferably the former—in Sinkiang, perhaps, or in Inner Mongolia where the need is greatest. This model goal coincides with China's present capacity to absorb educated young people in industrial and service employments. To avoid overproducing overeducated people and creating intellectual joblessness, the universities have been turned into vocational-technical schools and the number of students attending them has been greatly reduced. Emphasis is placed on the acquisition of applied skills and the solution of practical problems through practice. This, combined with a positive attitude toward labor, is what really counts. Full-time formal education ("book knowledge") is under a cloud, although this is less true now than it was a few years back.

Mao has demonstrated that it is possible to run a big but not very complex economy without economics and economists. He has also shown that it is feasible to conduct the business of society by relying on a network of political cadres, an implanted ethic of service

to the community, fear, pride of achievement, pragmatism, and some common sense. The secret lies in a tight grass-roots organization and the maintenance of transparency. The basic social unit must at all times operate in a glare of mass supervision and censure. This does not eliminate the need for public security organs, but it economizes on them. Those in charge of local networks (the production team, the workshop, street, or block committee) need support from their superiors without benefit of tenure. Their continuance in office is made contingent on "correct" political consciousness. And what is "correct" is liable to frequent reappraisal without notice.

CONCLUSION

In one of his less engaging moods, Nikita Khrushchev once said that communism is not "a lot of hungry people sitting around a table in perfect equality." This, he said, was what the Maoist leadership was trying to establish. The description is wrong in two respects. First, there are no hungry people in China.⁴ Second, there is no perfect equality, but there is more equality in China than anywhere else. Much of it is simply the absence of ostensible inequality. A poor peasant may earn 12 yuan a month; a high party or government official may earn 450 yuan. But the official will try to live and look like a poor peasant, at least in public. If he does not, he will be cut down to size, if not now, then during some future cultural leveling operation. Today, the Chinese are as discreet about income and power differences as they are about sex. And that is very discreet.

The problem of providing a rapidly growing population with the necessities of life is tackled in several ways that dovetail into each other. The land is being remade by hand on a scale I would judge unparalleled in history. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of small- and medium-sized plants in the countryside turn out chemical fertilizer, tools, farm machinery, and other means of raising farm productivity and breaking through the traditional agricultural production ceiling. Family limitation is encouraged by something that resembles Malthusian moral restraint; but unlike the Malthusian prescription, restraint is enforced by enormous peer group pressure.

(Continued on page 134)

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⁴ Except, presumably, for people in labor re-education camps and other places of correction.

"In the future, Chinese society may be shaped more by a combination of nationalistic priorities and pragmatic goals than by the utopian ideals that Mao prescribed for China."

Chinese Society in Transition

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AFTER ONE QUARTER of a century of Communist rule, Chinese society is still in a period of transition. Efforts by the Communist government to destroy the fabric of the traditional society, which were intensified during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), resurged in the recent campaign to vilify Confucius. The traditional force derived from the time-honored teachings of Confucianism and the Chinese primacy of allegiance to the family are still considered so detrimental to the new social order that the Chinese Communist leaders believe only a continuing revolution can avert the revival of "feudal" tradition and "bourgeois" influences.

For more than two thousand years, Chinese society was dominated by Confucian doctrine and was built on the cornerstone of the Chinese family system.

In essence, Confucianism is a secular exposition involving doctrines on human nature and on the relationship between man and society. It contains criteria of social conduct as well as teachings on how man can and must improve himself. It deals with political, social and ethical problems, and its main goal is to attain social order and harmony. According to the ancient Chinese concept, there is harmony within the interrelationship of all matter in the cosmos; this harmony embraces mankind and his activities and should be inviolate. Confucianism provides a rational, or relatively rational, approach in understanding the world. It has persisted as an integrated system that has worked for an orderly and humane society.¹

In the pursuit of social harmony, the Chinese family served as a model for society. The family and the clan embraced a man's life from birth to death and even beyond, and were the measure and the core of his existence. According to Confucian doctrine, there were five basic human relationships in every society

—the relationship between prince and minister, parents and offspring, older and younger brothers, husband and wife, and friend and friend—and three of these were in the family. Politically, the state was thought of as a larger family. Confucianism insisted that "in order to rightly govern the state, it is necessary to regulate the family first." "The ruler, therefore, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state."² In the West, the clan today is only a historical or literary concept, but in China until yesterday it was a living reality.

Economically, the family constituted a self-sufficient unit that was able to provide the necessary subsistence. Most firms in traditional China were family businesses. With regard to income distribution, to a certain extent, the Chinese family performed the functions that in modern Western nations are associated with sickness and unemployment insurance, old age pensions and life insurance. Filial piety was considered the highest of all moral virtues and it required the utmost sacrifice on the part of children for their parents. The traditional family system thus formed the keystone of Chinese society.

Outside the family, Chinese society was traditionally graded or classified by major occupational groups; scholar-officials at the top of the social pyramid were followed by peasants, artisans and merchants, in descending order. Chinese intellectuals were a pillar of the empire, its chief support, and were the models that everyone should imitate and emulate. Naturally, these intellectuals held aloof from the working mass. This was the root of the traditional social division between mental and manual labor, a phenomenon the Communists seek to get rid of.

SOCIAL CAMPAIGNS

The Confucian doctrine, the family system, and the social structure provided a self-adjusting equilibrium that upheld the old social order for more than 20 centuries. The Revolution of 1911 ended the cycle of dynasty, yet the basic fabric of the traditional society remained intact. After the success of the Communist

¹ James T. C. Liu, "Integrative Factors through Chinese History, Their Interaction," in T. C. Liu and W. M. Tu (eds), *Traditional China* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 16.

² From *Ta-Hsüeh* (The Great Learning).

revolution in 1949, the new rulers in Peking vowed to uproot the old system once and for all. The new guiding philosophy is Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, which in many fundamental aspects constitute an antithesis of Chinese tradition. While the Confucian doctrine stressed the importance of harmony, the new doctrine regards "class struggle" as the driving engine of human society. Moreover, while the traditional system highly esteemed the intellectuals, Mao's ideology sees workers as the masters of the society. Mao has also proclaimed the superiority of peasant wisdom and the virtue of learning-by-doing. He has been strongly antagonistic to intellectuals, almost to the point of being anti-intellectual. Furthermore, while traditional society looked on family as the source of social stability, Mao sees it as the root of individualism and social disintegration.

Thus, for the first time in Chinese history, the family system was scored as a chief obstacle to the common goal defined by the ruler.

To build a new society along the lines of Marxism-Leninism and the Thoughts of Mao, since 1949 the Communist leaders have aimed at the realization of three distinct yet related goals. One is the creation of a "new Chinese man," characterized by total selflessness and "all-round development" and able to do both mental and manual labor. The second goal is the establishment of a society based on an egalitarian spirit and collective life. The third goal is the modernization of the national economy to enable the society gradually to improve its material well-being.

From the land reform of 1949 to the Cultural Revolution in recent years, there have been many social campaigns, or *yun-tung's* as the Chinese Communists call them. Three kinds of campaigns have been designed. The first is to remold people's minds or to destroy old ideology and establish new ideology, a process popularly known in the West as "brainwashing," but in China called "thought reform."³

The second type of campaign is socio-political, aiming at the reform of the socio-economic structure. Of this type were the land reform campaign (1949-1952), the suppressing counter-revolutionists campaign (1951), the three-anti and five-anti campaigns (1952), the socialization in urban economy (1956-1957), the anti-rightists campaign (1957-1958), the communization (1958-1959), the socialist education movement (1963-1965), and the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). The functions of such social campaigns are (a) to eliminate the enemies of

the regime—real or potential; (b) to achieve particular political purposes; and (c) to reform the social economic structure.

The third kind of campaign is the "rectification campaign" within the Communist party which occurs every three or four years. The aim of this type of campaign is two-fold: to maintain a high standard of competence and performance for party members, and to conduct inner-party struggle, to settle differences within the party.

SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION

In addition to social transformation is the problem of remolding the minds of 800 million Chinese. To the Chinese Communist leaders, men are malleable and properly indoctrinated people will be able to achieve state goals.

Aware of the fact that Marxism-Leninism is alien to Chinese intellectuals, who usually came from bourgeois or petty bourgeois backgrounds and who for centuries were ardent followers of Confucian teachings, the Communist leaders regard "thought reform" as indispensable if a new social order is to be established in China.

"Thought reform" started with the self-rejection of all old beliefs and led to the adoption of Mao's Thoughts as the norm. Beginning in 1951, "thought reform" was accelerated in universities and colleges. Students were encouraged to challenge professors' interpretations of and attitudes toward philosophy, history and political affairs. A professor was often "invited" to face student assemblies, where he was urged to "confess" openly all his past sins against communism and his adherence to the traditional or Western bourgeois ideology. In the absence of such self-revelation, he might be subjected to severe criticism and humiliation. Academicians and professors in the social sciences were the main targets; as a result, almost every social scientist educated in the pre-1949 era had to denounce himself and repudiate his scholastic achievements.

"Thought reform" goes beyond the intellectuals to reach the entire population; thus the incessant campaign to study Marxist-Leninist doctrines and the Thoughts of Mao. Small study groups of six to twelve individuals are organized under assigned leaders in every office, factory, shop, school, commune, military or residential unit in China. These groups are required to meet regularly to study Mao's Thoughts and his latest instructions. The method of indoctrination by "criticism and self-criticism" is also widely applied to the entire population. In a study group, the ideas of each member are criticized by others according to the standard set by the party. Everyone is forced to apply that standard and is not allowed to sit back passively.⁴ According to recent

³ Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The Thought Reform of Intellectuals" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1959; and Harriet C. Mills, "Thought Reform: Ideological Remolding in China," in *The Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1959.

⁴ Harriet C. Mills, *op. cit.*

Western visitors, neighborhood study groups meet three times a week for four hours at a time, while factory study groups meet after work for one and one-half hours four times a week. Most sessions are devoted to studying Mao's Thoughts and current affairs.⁵

The entire educational system and the whole enterprise of literature and the arts serve as instruments for "thought reform." Before the Cultural Revolution, political indoctrination occupied one-fifth of the study hours in colleges and universities. Now it accounts for more than one-third. Music, literature and theater are reoriented with strong revolutionary flavor. According to Mao:

All culture or all present-day literature and art belong to a certain class . . . there is no such thing as art for art's sake, or literature and art that lie above class distinction or above partisan interests. There is no such thing as literature and art running parallel to politics or being independent of politics.

He appealed to workers in the fields of literature and art "to fit art and literature into the whole revolutionary machinery as one of its component parts, to make them a powerful weapon for uniting and educating the people."⁶

Primarily responsible for the indoctrination, however, is the mass media system. Newspapers in China carry no divergent political views, no news of general interest. The whole propaganda machine is directed toward one goal—to indoctrinate the people and reorient them toward a new philosophy in which national identity, political ideology and organization are more important than parochialism, the family and regional loyalty.⁷

In the process of indoctrination, Mao's works are the ultimate truth. Publications in China today seldom fail to quote Mao's works. The most popular motto in recent years has been: "Read the works of Chairman Mao, follow his teachings, and act according to his instructions." In Chinese society, Mao's Thoughts assume the status of a state religion—a new code of values.

The consequence of this intensive mind-remolding process can be viewed both positively and negatively.

⁵ Barbara W. Tuchman, *Notes from China* (New York: Collier Books, 1972), pp. 30 and 35.

⁶ Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Yen'an Forum on Art and Literature," in *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 63–64.

⁷ Alan P. L. Liu, *Communications and National Integration in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 175.

⁸ Chu-yuan Cheng, *Communist China's Economy 1949–1962* (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1963), pp. 138–139.

⁹ Tuchman, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁰ Harrison E. Salisbury, *To Peking and Beyond, A Report on the New Asia* (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), pp. 138–139.

¹¹ For instance, Mao in 1955 admitted that China is in a state of both "poverty and blank."

¹² Chu-yuan Cheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–97.

Under Communist rule, Chinese society has achieved great uniformity—uniformity of conduct, uniformity of thought and habit, perfect obedience, submission to orders, and subordination of personality to a higher scheme. The rulers in Peking have turned the country into a colossus and can mobilize millions of people with a single directive. During the Great Leap Forward (1958–1959), for instance, the regime was able to put 100 million people into water irrigation projects and another 60 million people into the backyard blast furnace campaign.⁸

The most obvious negative effect of this process, as noted by an American historian:

is the mental monotone imposed upon the country. . . .

All thought, all ideas, past, present and future, not to mention the historical record, are twisted, manipulated, rolled out and flattened into one, expressed in a half dozen slogans dinned incessantly and insistently into the heads of the public.⁹

The result is the emergence of a new generation which appears to be strikingly uninformed. Most of the youth in China today know nothing whatever about Chinese history prior to "liberation" in 1949. They are ignorant of conditions beyond the frontiers of China and are only mildly interested in learning about things that do not directly touch them. As another Western observer has pointed out, young Chinese are "intellectually uncurious and uninformed, almost to the point of illiteracy about matters that do not relate closely to their lives and their country's interest."¹⁰

LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS

Along with the remolding of people's minds, another vital reform during the past 25 years has been the creation of an egalitarian society in which the gulf between the rich and the poor, between the social elite and the mass, and between man and woman has gradually diminished.

Realizing that poverty was prevalent in China and that there was no magic wand that could lift people's living standards overnight,¹¹ the Chinese Communist leaders concluded that the only way to command mass support was through an equitable distribution of income. In the first decade, incessant campaigns were devoted to eradicating private property as a source of personal income. After the socialization of private enterprises in 1956 and the communization of farm households in 1958, private property as an institution virtually vanished. To ensure minimum subsistence to every citizen, a strict scheme of rationing of food grains, cotton fabrics and edible oils was introduced in 1954 and 1955. This resulted in an equal allotment of basic staples for the entire population.¹²

Egalitarian spirit was also applied to the wage system. The country as a whole had a unified wage scale. Industrial workers were classified in seven or eight grades, with pay gradually increasing on the basis of tenure and skill. The wage spread between

the lowest workers and the highest-paid specialists or executives was never more than five or six to one and normally it was no more than 50 percent.¹³

Egalitarian spirit was fully reflected in the area of sex roles. Before the 1949 revolution, the role of women in China was markedly inferior to that of men. One massive problem of the Maoist revolution was how to liberate the women or, in terms of politics and economics, how to achieve a sexless as well as a classless society. Women's liberation in China is symbolized by uniformity in dress and in job assignment. Women wear the same costume as men and undertake work that formerly was monopolized by men. The two sexes participate equally in agriculture, industry, and transportation, and even in military activities. Women are trained and employed in large numbers as engineers, technicians, crane operators and truck drivers. They weld ships, turn lathes and receive the same wages as men.¹⁴

If the egalitarian principle has in some sense boosted the morale of the poor and the hitherto deprived minority, it has nonetheless failed to raise significantly the living standard for the country as a whole. According to current unofficial estimates, per capita income in 1970 was about \$145 in China as compared with \$350 in Taiwan, \$1,900 in Japan and \$4,800 in the United States.¹⁵ The average monthly wage for a Chinese worker in 1974 was officially reported as 50 to 60 yuan or \$23.50 to \$28.00 based on the official exchange rate (1 yuan = \$0.47).¹⁶

In terms of purchasing power, the Chinese wage is much higher than the dollar amount. Prices for foodgrains, rent and medicines remain very low. For instance, the price of a kilogram of medium-grade flour is 0.36 yuan, of rice 0.28 yuan. A kilogram of pork costs 1.80 yuan in medium and large cities. The average price of medicines in 1972 was 80 percent less than in 1950.¹⁷ Other consumer goods are relatively expensive. The price of a new bicycle in China,

for example, is about 140 yuan, an equivalent of two month's wages for an average worker.¹⁸

Conditions for public health have improved considerably. The large-scale "patriotic sanitation campaign" of the 1950's and the continuous application of large doses of DDT have reduced the populations of the country's four major pests—flies, mosquitoes, rats, and mice. Most of the country's chronic epidemics such as cholera, smallpox, measles, diphtheria, and typhus as well as tuberculosis and venereal diseases have either been eradicated or are under control.¹⁹

The improvement in public health, however, has created other problems. As the death rate declined steeply, population growth surged upward. During the first five-year-plan period (1952–1957), the natural growth rate was as high as 2.2 percent per year. The annual population increase in recent years was estimated at between 14 million and 15 million people. The increasing numbers have exerted conspicuous pressures on food supply and housing, and have created great difficulties with regard to employment. Between 1952 and 1972, when the population increased by 50 percent, foodgrain output rose only 43 percent. As a result, China had to spend her scarce foreign exchange to import more than 50 million tons of foodgrains between 1961 and 1971.²⁰ As population was tripling or quadrupling, housing space was barely doubling; this led to a steady decline of housing space per resident.²¹

More serious than food and shelter conditions was the lack of job opportunities for the new labor force. Between 1952 and 1957, the total labor force rose 20 million, and employment opportunities in the industrial sector increased by only 1.78 million. This accounted for only nine percent of the addition to the labor force. Surplus labor has continuously flowed into the countryside, causing a continuing decline of land holding per farmer. Everywhere in China one finds factories, communes and state-run stores overstaffed—the symptom of underemployment.

A high rate of population growth, underemployment, low labor productivity and low income form a vicious circle that hinders growth in capital formation and makes advancement in the living standard extremely difficult. Despite 25 years of intensified industrialization, mainland China's standard of living is still among the lowest in East Asia.

CONTINUATION OR REVOLUTION?

In terms of ideology and social structure, the Communist revolution brought about unprecedented changes in Chinese society. However, the family system, the acquisitive instincts of the common people, and much of the traditional value system still prevail.

Replacing the traditional concept of harmony, "class struggle" became the guiding principle in the

¹³ Wassily Leontief, "Socialism in China," in *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1973, p. 75, and Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

¹⁴ C. L. Sulzberger, "Women's Lib in China," *The New York Times*, November, 24, 1973.

¹⁵ U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, 1972, p. 43. According to a recent estimate by James Tobin, per capita income in 1971 was US \$116. See Tobin, "The Economy of China: A Tourist's View," *Challenge*, March, 1973.

¹⁶ *China Reconstructs* (Peking, April, 1974), p. 40.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁸ Leontief, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Robert M. Worth, "New China's Accomplishments in the Control of Diseases," in Myron E. Wegman, Tsung-yi Lin and Elizabeth F. Purcell (eds), *Public Health in the People's Republic of China* (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, 1973), pp. 173–184.

²⁰ Chu-yuan Cheng, "Food and Agricultural Problems in China," *Current History*, vol. 65, no. 385 (September, 1973), p. 123.

²¹ For example, population in Wuhan tripled between 1949 and 1972 but housing space only doubled. (See Harrison Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 112.)

new society. In order to wage class struggle, the Chinese Communist leaders deliberately created social conflicts by mobilizing one segment of the population to struggle against the other. During the land reform movement in 1949–1952, people in rural areas were arbitrarily classified as landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and tenants. The landlords were singled out as class enemies and subjected to brutal purges and humiliations even after they offered to surrender their properties voluntarily.²² In 1960–1961, ten years after completion of the land reform, there was a new campaign to reclassify people in the villages in order to continue “class struggle.” Many peasants were reclassified as landlords, although they no longer possessed any land.

Today, the whole population is divided into “people” and “non-people.” The former category includes workers, peasants, soldiers, and those regarded by the government as “good citizens.” The latter includes those on the “black list”—ex-landlords, rightists, reactionaries, capitalists, revisionists, and so on. Ten percent of the population is in the “non-people” or “bad elements” category. Periodic “class struggle” has created an atmosphere of fear.

The idea of permanent revolution is another innovative concept. Never in Chinese history has a ruler in power initiated a strong emotional upheaval like the Cultural Revolution in order to destroy his own ruling machine. But according to Mao, such disorder, or *luan*, is the only way to clear the air and refresh the spirit.

In the social structure, the purpose of the new efforts is to eliminate the scholar and the merchant classes. Under communism, society is supposed to be comprised only of workers and peasants. Intellectuals, the social elite in the Confucian state, are now treated as a group whose social status is lower than peasants and workers. During the Cultural Revolution, scholars and high officials were ordered to learn from uneducated workers and farmers. Millions of copies of classical books were burned by the Red Guard, and the publication of scholarly works came to a halt. The regime's attitude toward intellectuals was similar to that of Ch'in Shih-Huang, the greatest dictator in China (221–210 B.C.), who ordered the burning of all copies of Confucian books and buried alive some 460 scholars. The recent campaign to denounce Confucius is coupled with enthusiastic praise of Ch'in Shih-Huang who (since his death in 210 B.C.) had been regarded by Chinese historians as the cruellest of China's despots. The regime's open justification

of Ch'in's tyrannical practices as “progressive measures” represents a total deviation from the traditional norm.²³

The government's intervention and direct control over people's lives has no parallel in the past. Never in Chinese history has a government penetrated into the private lives of common people so deeply as the present rulers in Peking. Many long lasting social institutions such as clans, popular religions, and various secret societies and underground organizations have either been undermined or put under control. Clan temples, which were the headquarters of the Chinese family and the steadfast holds of the old society, have been transformed into public mess halls or day-care centers. The entire population has been regimented in various mass organizations like Communist youth leagues, peasant associations, women's associations, trade unions, and so forth. The traditional ties of family relations, religious beliefs or business connections have basically been broken. By means of political surveillance, food rationing and thought reform, the government has effectively turned individual citizens into cogs and screws of the gigantic state machine.

Despite these dramatic changes, traditional forces have not lost ground completely and have always reappeared. In 1958, the Communist leaders took a decisive step to demolish the family system by regimenting the rural population of 500 million into 24,000 people's communes. In the early stage (1958–1959), the commune was proclaimed by the leaders as a ladder to Communist paradise. Peasants were required to surrender to the commune all their property and belongings, including the small plot of land that they were allowed to retain after the collectivization in 1956–1957. They were ordered to destroy their private kitchens and to eat together in the mess halls, place their children into communal nurseries and work under central management. All these steps were intended to break the family system and to create the so-called “new Communist man.” However, after one year of experimentation, the commune system proved to be unworkable. After 1959, steps were taken to retain the family as a social unit. Small plots of land were returned to individual households; private kitchens were reestablished; and family life

(Continued on page 135)

²² Chu-yuan Cheng, *Communist China's Economy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–26.

²³ Hung Shih-ti, *Ch'in Shih-Huang* (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, May, 1972), pp. 64, 66, 68, also Shih Ting, “Defending the Burning of Books and the Burying of Scholars Alive,” in *People's Daily* (Peking), October 28, 1973.

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"In the past three years, a number of specialists in the areas of obstetrics, medical chemistry, political science in the demographic field, family planning, and child care visited China to observe general health and family planning programs. Their first-hand reports provide new information."

Planned Population Growth in China

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THE POPULATION POLICY of the People's Republic of China has gone through several phases since the establishment of the republic in 1949. From 1949 until mid-1953, both state and party officials publicly accepted the promises of Marxism at face value. The optimistic stance of the Chinese leaders interpreted Marxist precepts to mean that an abundant population was an asset to China's economic development. The elimination of Chinese feudalism and foreign capitalist exploitation would raise the production zeal and thus the productivity of the peasants. The full mobilization of China's human resources would rapidly lift China's economy from a backward state to the status of an advanced industrial power.

Between mid-1953 and the spring of 1957 there was apparently a gradual erosion of optimism regarding food and population on the part of some of the leaders, possibly because of a reassessment of agricultural and population growth. The trend of foodgrain supplies, according to the reconstructed official data,¹ increased at a declining rate during 1949–1957. The annual increase was 16 percent for 1950, 8 percent for 1951, and 14 percent for 1952. The annual increase for 1953 through 1957 was 2 percent, 2 percent, 9 percent, 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The census of 1953 revealed a population of 586 million instead of the expected (or often quoted) figure of 400 or 450 million. Estimates of annual natural rate of population growth made by various sources² for the pre-1949 decades ranged from 0.48 percent to 1.13 percent. The official data for 1949–1957 indicated an average growth rate of 2.0 percent for 1949–1952 and 2.3 percent for 1953–1957. For the period 1949–1957 as a whole the increase in foodgrain output was indeed more than that in population. But the reduction in the growth rate of foodgrain, plus a rising population growth rate from a large population base (1953), undoubtedly posed an economic dilemma for any concerned leadership.

In pre-1949 China, the most common causes of high mortality were bandits, local famines and diseases, recurring floods, and wars. Since 1949, there has been great progress in conditions of health, food supply, civil order, and survival. The causes of formerly high mortality have largely been eliminated. With improved living conditions, the mortality rate dropped steadily, while the fertility rate remained high or even increased somewhat, especially during the first half of the 1950's.

At the 1954 national people's congress, the topic of population was mentioned publicly for the first time. In March, 1955, the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist party issued a statement giving limited support to birth control. But a concerted effort on birth control in the form of a recognizable birth control program did not really begin until 1956. The peak of this first campaign was reached in March, 1957, when a birth control committee was formed.³ But the campaign soon suffered from attacks by party theoreticians, which reached their climax when Ma Yin-chu, the most outspoken advocate of birth control, was bitterly criticized by the anti-Malthusian critics. Despite such attacks, official support for birth control was not withdrawn. Although there were no new high-level endorsements, birth control publicity gathered momentum in the remaining months of 1957 and the first few months of 1958.

Although the birth control campaign greatly increased the supply of contraceptives between 1954 and 1957, the problems of cost, quality, variety, and

¹ Chu-yuan Cheng, "Economic Fluctuations on the Chinese Mainland 1949–72," *Issues & Studies*, April, 1974, p. 37.

² K. C. Yeh and Carolyn Lee, "Communist China's Population Problem in the 1980's," *Issues & Studies*, March, 1974, pp. 15–16, 20.

³ Raymond L. Morrison, Jr., and Jack D. Salmon, "Population Control in China: A Reinterpretation," *Asian Survey*, September, 1973, pp. 874–6.

quantity of contraceptives remained an obstacle to mass use.⁴ Propaganda approaches to birth control included the use of newspaper articles, exhibits, public lectures and discussions, motion pictures, books and pamphlets, traveling propaganda teams, and radio and loudspeakers. Despite the continuous stream of propaganda on planned birth, the popular resistance remained strong. Popular resistance was rooted in the Confucian concept that identified early marriage, male children, and numerous descendants with filial piety. In addition, the doubts and fears of the public about the effect of contraceptives on health and associated issues prevailed. In short, the population was not properly prepared for such a radical change in its traditional ethic. The impact of the population-control program on fertility was probably minimal at best.

As the Great Leap Forward campaign and the introduction of people's communes gathered momentum in 1958–1959, birth control devices and propaganda began to wane, and the birth control campaign may have reached its bottom by 1961. The campaign had been initiated in a period dominated by administrative pragmatism and the awareness of the balance between population and food. The Great Leap, on the other hand, was a product of extreme administrative enthusiasm and an exaggerated confidence in institutional reorganization and mass participation as a solution to all economic problems. Thus it is no surprise that this campaign could not survive in the Great Leap atmosphere. However, three years of natural calamities in succession, from 1959 through 1961, not only brought the Great Leap to an end but also created a continuing acute food crisis. Some sober soul-searching and a reordering of economic priorities took place in 1961. As a result, a reorganization of the communes was carried out in that year. In January, 1962, a new regulation provided for the duty-free importation of contraceptive devices and drugs. In March and April, 1962, after a long lapse, the press began to publish news items and articles on the advantages of late marriage and birth control. In September, 1962, the Central Committee of the party announced a new policy of "agriculture first," which represented a reversal of the

former policy that had given first priority to the development of industry, especially heavy basic industry. Thus, the second campaign of birth control was obviously the offspring of an environment in which the nation had experienced a severe food crisis and a population problem.

The second birth control campaign remained active from 1962 to 1966; then the program was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1969. During this second campaign, officials emphasized the advantages of planned childbirth and smaller families, the health of mothers and children, the opportunities for work, training and political education for parents, the socialist construction of the fatherland, and the economic well-being of the family.

The propaganda tactics used in the second campaign⁵ were similar to those of the first campaign. But forums, exhibitions, meetings, and conferences were combined with an intensive "education campaign" in street committees, schools, communes, and factories. In addition, contraception was publicized by maternal health clinics. The methods of contraception most commonly used in the first campaign were the condom, the diaphragm, and a variety of spermicidal jellies, creams, foam powders and suppositories. During the second campaign the intra-uterine device (IUD) was added.

The effectiveness of the second campaign was difficult to measure because of a paucity of statistical data. Furthermore, the significance of abortion, sterilization, and late marriage cannot be easily assessed. Popular acceptance of birth control measures was not strong. A concentration of effort on changes in values would bring results only in the long run. Reliable contraceptives and a well-established network of trained medical personnel and clinics were, however, indispensable for the successful implementation of an urgent birth control program. But they were not available in the magnitude necessary for the successful implementation of a program supposedly aimed at more than 90 million married women of reproductive age, especially in rural areas. Thus fertility rates probably did not decline appreciably in urban areas, and the impact on rural fertility rates must have been minimal.

During the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969, the birth control program was publicly ignored and slowed down, but it was not abandoned. Actually, crucial groundwork had been laid for a future campaign during this period. First, steroid oral contraceptives were tested in the second half of the 1960's, and their large-scale promotion started in 1969, according to the reports of Carl Djerassi.⁶ Second, the public health services network that is indispensable for the delivery of family planning services was extended rapidly into the rural areas. This was largely a product of the Cultural Revolution. By the end of 1969,

⁴ John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China," *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 18, 1972), pp. 255, 273.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 287–304.

⁶ Professor Carl Djerassi observed the fertility control program in China during his spring 1973 lecture trip to China. His observations were reported in the following articles: "Fertility Limitation through Contraceptive Steroids in the PRC," *Studies in Family Planning*, January, 1974, pp. 13–30; "Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China," *The China Quarterly*, January/March, 1974, pp. 40–62.

the turmoil associated with the Cultural Revolution finally subsided; and among the many programs to be resumed the third birth control campaign was re-activated.

Before President Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1972, reports of American "China watchers" on contraceptive practices in China in the 1950's and the 1960's were obtained largely by the "traditional method": careful scrutiny of the Chinese press and medical journals, and official pronouncements of leading officials. However, the media coverage in recent years may not supply sufficient relevant information on the change in the quality, depth, and magnitude of China's birth control program in the past few years. Because the program has concentrated on the grass-roots level, using the existing network of health services, the relative role in family planning played by impersonal messages in the mass media declined in recent years. In the past three years, a number of specialists in the areas of obstetrics, medical chemistry, political science in the demographic field, family planning, and child care visited China to observe general health and family planning programs. Their first-hand reports on the birth control program provide new information. Because of space limitations, only the summarized impressions and information from five specialists will be used as the basis for discussion.⁷

A network of general health services has been established in both urban and rural areas. In rural areas, a county is divided into units of production area called "communes." The population of each rural commune varies from 20,000 to 60,000 people. In order to further their economic activities, communes are divided into a number of sections called production brigades, which are in turn subdivided into production teams. Each production team has a health station which is generally staffed by two "barefoot doctors." Barefoot doctors are integrated members of the community in which they work. They are responsible for vaccinations, environmental health,

the administration of first aid in emergencies, the evaluation of seriousness of different diseases, the transfer of patients to better-trained medical personnel, and the treatment of minor illness. Each production brigade has a health center that is staffed by barefoot doctors alone or by barefoot doctors plus one or more assistant doctors, aided by midwives, nurses and medical assistants. A center has no beds for hospitalization and serves only as an out-patient clinic. Each commune has a small hospital with an out-patient clinic and beds for hospitalization.⁸ There may be no hospitals in some small communes or in the communes of more remote backward regions. In such cases, county hospitals provide the commune with health services.

Family planning services at the commune level are the special responsibility of the committee on planned birth work. It is headed either by the chairman (or vice chairman) of the commune's revolutionary committee or by a female cadre member. Other members of the committee include cadre members who are connected with the planned birth work of various sub-units of the commune. This committee is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of planned birth work in the commune. Associated with the production brigade or team is a small group on planned birth work, with similar personnel, under the supervision of the commune committee.

The female cadre at each of three levels of planned birth units is responsible for the day-to-day work on birth control. She is usually a married woman and is often the head of the local branch of the Women's Federation. She is responsible for "educational" and "thought" work, and is assisted by activists of the local branch of the Women's Federation and the Young Communist League. The "educational" and "thought" work (or persuasion work) is designed to change people's attitudes and motivation toward planned childbirth. Pro-planned-childbirth views are diffused to the population in periodic mass meetings and home visits. Emphasis, however, is on a face-to-face approach through small group meetings and home visits where peer pressure can be exerted more effectively. Impersonal communication through the mass media is considered less effective.

Barefoot doctors play the role of task personnel. They provide contraceptive knowledge and materials to the target population and make follow-up visits to patients under the guidance of the committee of planned birth work.⁹ They also serve as intermediaries between the clinics or hospitals and those eligible for sterilization or those with unwanted pregnancies. Inserting IUD's, treating the side effects or complications arising from contraceptive use, and performing induced abortions, tubal ligations and vasectomies are normally performed by better trained midwives, nurses, assistant doctors, or fully trained doctors.

⁷ Professor Carl Djerassi (see footnote no. 6); Dr. Anibal Faundes, professor of obstetrics at Barros Luco Hospital, Santiago, Chile and Tapani Luukkainen, docent of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Helsinki (both physicians visited China in the spring of 1972); Pi-chao Chen, associate professor in the department of political science at Wayne State University, who visited China in the summer of 1972; and Tameyoshi Katagiri, professor emeritus of Keiyo University, director of the Family Planning Federation of Japan, who gave lectures on family planning programs in other countries during his spring, 1972, trip to China (he had previously observed the family program in China in 1964 and 1965).

⁸ Anibal Faundes and Tapani Luukkainen, "Health and Family Planning Services in the Chinese People's Republic," *Studies in Family Planning*, July, 1972, pp. 165-76.

⁹ Pi-chao Chen, "China's Population Program at the Grass-Roots Level," *Studies in Family Planning*, August, 1973, pp. 219-27.

Barefoot doctors are also assisted by team-level midwives and health aides.

In urban residential areas, the municipality is organized into neighborhood units. Health services for residents in neighborhood units are provided by a neighborhood or district hospital and by small health stations called street and lane health stations. Each health station serves a section of the neighborhood unit and is usually staffed by a few "native doctors," who are responsible for treating simple diseases and emergencies and providing preventive health care. (The term native doctor refers to the urban counterpart of the barefoot doctor). The function of native doctors in family planning is to distribute contraceptives, mostly oral, to patients and to refer applicants for induced abortion or sterilization to neighborhood hospitals. Each native doctor is assisted by a number of volunteer housewives, who perform the services of delivering oral and other contraceptives from the station to married women of reproductive age in their neighborhoods. Both native doctors and volunteer housewives work as a permanent sub-unit of the committee on planned birth work. This committee, which has overall responsibility for the "educational" and "thought" work with regard to planned birth in the neighborhood, is normally chaired by a female cadre member who is also a member of the neighborhood committee. As a whole, family planning services are more adequate, pervasive and penetrating in large cities, where target population is more motivated toward planned childbirth. In rural areas, especially less developed areas, facilities are much less adequate and the target population is less well-motivated toward birth control.

Nearly all birth control methods are free. However, conventional contraceptives, like condoms, diaphragms, foam tablets, and suppositories are provided at very low prices¹⁰ in urban pharmacies and at brigade or team grocery cooperatives. Oral contraceptives are free; they are given to patients in lots of 22 pills, and the supply to the patients is replenished each month by the medical personnel. Patients (presumably full-time workers) who have birth-control operations are entitled to rest periods with full pay, e.g., three weeks for a tubal ligation, two weeks for an induced abortion, and two days for an IUD insertion and one day for a vasectomy.

During his trip to China, Professor Carl Djerassi

¹⁰ For example, prices in the cities are U.S.\$0.04 for 12 tablets; U.S.\$0.09 for 10 suppositories; U.S.\$0.01 for two condoms.

¹¹ Carl Djerassi, *op. cit.*, January/March, 1974, pp. 42, 51.

¹² Tameyoshi Katagiri, "A Report on the Family Planning Program in the People's Republic of China," *Studies in Family Planning*, August, 1973, pp. 216-8.

¹³ Pi-chao Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

¹⁴ 1972 *World Population Data Sheet*, Population Reference Bureau.

¹⁵ Leo A. Orleans, *Current Scene*, May 10, 1972, p. 18.

noticed rapid changes in the field of fertility control. First, the use of oral contraceptives has gained popularity rapidly, while the use of IUD's is on the decline. Second, abortions are also on the decline, at least in urban areas, and the emphasis is now on prevention (contraception) rather than abortion. Third, in some urban areas the extent of sterilization, especially among females, may approach that of contraception, and sterilization is now recommended to parents of two or more children. Fourth, the output of oral contraceptives in 1972 may suffice for 20 million women per year. Judged by an international standard, oral contraceptives were being produced at an impressive rate in China. Fifth, based on the assumptions that 100 million women, out of the 800-million population, are of reproductive age, and that 50 percent of those practicing birth control are oral contraceptive users, Djerassi's tentative projection indicated that possibly up to one-third¹¹ of these 100 million women (the target population) may now be practicing birth control in one way or another. Sixth, by now the "hardware" production capacity of contraceptives in China has either been solved or is on the verge of being solved.

The most important factors contributing to population limitation appear to be a relatively late age in marriage accompanied by strictly observed chastity prior to marriage and the dramatic surge in the use of oral contraceptives. The legal marriage age in China is 18 for women and 20 for men. Chairman Mao recommended a legal marriage age of 23 for women and 26 for men. Reports by specialists on average marriage ages, however, vary widely. Apparently in the cities the average marriage age is close to the recommended ages of 23 and 26. In rural areas, the average marriage age is usually a few years earlier than in the cities.¹²

Population statistics ultimately measure the effectiveness of birth control. Although vital statistics and statistics for birth control are recorded for local levels, such as hospitals, factories, communes, counties and cities, there is a complete lack of such data at the national, regional and provincial levels. Nevertheless, data for the local level indicate a declining rate of annual population increase. On August 27, 1972, Premier Chou En-lai told a group of visitors from the United States that a census¹³ taken in 1964-1965, recorded the population at around 700 million, with a natural increase rate of just under 2 percent per year. Hsin Kan Pao of Hong Kong (May 5, 1973) reported that China's population now increases only at 1.9 percent per year. The U.N. estimate¹⁴ put China's population growth at 1.7 percent for 1972 and Leo Orleans¹⁵ projected a rate of 1.7 percent for 1970-1975.

Premier Chou En-lai once mentioned the goal of reducing the annual natural growth rate from over

2 percent in the 1950's to 2 percent by 1970, 1.5 percent by 1980 and 1 percent by the year 2000.¹⁶ To achieve such a rapid reduction in the natural rate of population growth is a large order for a nation like China, where the death rate is declining but is still high by the standard of industrial nations. An improvement in the quality and magnitude of general health services is necessary for the improvement in the quality and magnitude of family planning services. But the continuous improvement in the health services is bound further to reduce the death rate. This will raise the natural rate of population growth unless there is a corresponding decline in the birth rate. In short, the decline in the birth rate must exceed the decline in the death rate if a declining natural rate of growth is to be achieved. Therefore, there must be a more rapid increase in rural acceptance and practice of family planning in the near future if China is to reach the goal of an annual growth rate of 1.5 percent by 1980 (or 1.25 percent by 1990).

Two major problems remain: the greater penetration of the family planning message (persuasion) and improved medical personnel in rural areas; and a more rapid increase in the demand for family planning by the rural population. Current educational and political conditions in China obviously favor greater penetration. But a more rapid increase in the demand for birth control depends not only on the success of greater penetration but also on a number of socio-economic factors. The drop in birth rates in all the industrialized nations in the past has been associated with the impact of industrialization and urbanization (changes in economic and social institutions) on popular attitudes. Thus popular acceptance of birth control has been by and large the by-product of substantial or complete industrialization and urbanization. Apparently, China's leaders are now trying to create a popular attitude favorable toward family planning even before a significant degree of industrialization and urbanization has been achieved.

Urban workers are now covered by a retirement pension, and a grains ration is available to all urban dwellers. In the communes, each member of the production team is given 450 to 480 chin of grains (each chin is equal to 1.1 pounds) irrespective of age or productive work. In some areas, the amount of grain allotted to children from birth to 10 years old is discounted by a factor of 40 percent to 10 percent. In addition, health services are now available to urban and rural population at a very low personal expense.

These provisions tend to reduce the incentive to plan a large family, especially sons, to insure security

in one's old age. However, the security and care for the aged provided by the government remain inadequate, especially in rural areas, when compared to the security provided by one's grown-up children. In addition, the new guaranteed provision of grains to everyone greatly reduces the hardship of bringing up children in the poorer agricultural areas. Thus, the incentive to curb family size is somewhat reduced.

In rural areas, the standard is still the extended family, in which the married son and his wife live with his parents. When a son starts to work, he contributes income to the family. When he marries, he adds a daughter-in-law, who also contributes to the family income in one way or another. Thus the traditional preference for male offspring and early marriage may still be found in the rural areas of China today. Furthermore, work performed by children for the production team also earns some work points for the family. As a family accumulates work points, its share of the net income of the production team increases somewhat. This aspect of the institutional structure obviously does not discourage the overgrowth of family size.

Certain aspects of current socio-economic institutions in China may have unintended consequences, reinforcing the preference for male offspring and a large family. Yet overall political, educational and economic conditions are conducive to a changed attitude toward family planning, especially among the younger generation. Probably the most crucial question is whether China's annual natural growth rate of population will drop to the target levels earlier than was originally planned. Given a population of 800 million for 1970 and the goal of a declining natural rate of increase from 2 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent by 1980 and to 1 percent by 2000, the population would be 949 million in 1980 and 1,087 million in 1990. However, as the "baby-boom" children born in the last two decades reach marriage age, a temporary rise in birth rate may occur in the 1980's, thus raising the 1990 population to a level much higher than the projected 1,087 million. In order to prevent this possible renewed upsurge in population in the 1980's, the natural growth rate target must be met prior to the target years.

Current expanded efforts on the agricultural sector should increase the food supply steadily for the next decade or so. But if there is a renewed upsurge of population, the race between food production and reproduction will once more be close.

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¹⁶ Edwin Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution," *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1967), p. 81.

"How this revolution will be institutionalized is still unclear. The question of China's future has not yet been answered. Can Mao's continued revolution be reintroduced 10, 20, or 30 times, to a utopian ending?"

China 1974: A New Course?

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THE YEAR 1974 in the People's Republic appeared to be under the sign of a new ideological ferment. The leading stars on the Chinese scene, Mao Tse-tung and his chief government executive leader, Chou En-lai, were declining and aging. Interpretations of the Chinese scene vary greatly. It is possible that Mao and Chou have been cooperating closely all along and have matters firmly in hand. It is also possible, in view of the news from China, that a bitter power struggle is raging over Mao's succession and the future course of Chinese policy. These contrary interpretations of the Chinese situation result partly from events in the past year: the tenth party congress (August 24 to 28, 1973), and the ideological rumblings of last summer's anti-Confucian drive. This drive, at year's end, was fused with a renewed anti-Lin Piao drive into a continuing country-wide campaign of criticism of Lin and Confucius.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), Mao succeeded, with the help of the Red Guards and the backing of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), in reaching his goal of fracturing the Chinese Communist party structure, which he no longer controlled. Mao did not succeed, however, in establishing the new political system that he had envisioned; instead, he had to accept a compromise. Mao's dream was the establishment of a Maoist "mass" organization, to take the place of the Communist party.

The model that he claimed to follow was that of the "Paris Commune of 1871." For a Marxist-Leninist, it was obviously risky to play with the concept of the Communist party structure introduced by Lenin. But the Paris Commune of 1871¹ was regarded by Marx

himself as a proletarian mass organization; using it as a model, Mao could pretend to stay within a Marxist framework, even while replacing the Leninist party concept.

Mao's hope at that time was dashed; and instead of a Maoist mass organization the Cultural Revolution ended with a tenuous fusion of the three major forces within the Cultural Revolution: the People's Liberation Army, the "liberated" cadres, and Mao's revolutionary rebels, officially termed the "three-in-one combination." There was not an even share of authority. Of the three forces, the PLA was clearly in command. It dominated the revolutionary committees of the new regional and local government administrations, the factories and the schools, and became the model for the new Maoist order. Twenty-three of the 29 regional revolutionary committees were chaired by PLA officers, most of whom were also commanders of the respective military regions and districts. They came to hold posts as first or second secretaries of the new party structure, formed from the "core groups" in the committees. These PLA commanders thus became strong regional power-holders and played a key role in the new party, as well as in the government structure throughout China. As Minister of Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, Lin Piao had built up the Cult of Mao, indoctrinated the PLA, organized the movements of the Red Guard and thus handed Mao his victory over the party. As a result, he was named as Mao's official successor in the party statutes at the ninth party congress in April, 1969.

The third faction, comprised of the Red Guard and the Maoist left, did not fare so well. Its leaders suffered the revenge of the local military leaders whom they had attacked in the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. When the military were in charge again, most Red Guard and revolutionary rebel leaders were removed from the revolutionary committees and the rank and file were sent to the countryside to "merge

¹ The Paris Commune of 1871 was established in defense of the city during the siege by Prussian troops. According to a *Red Flag* article March 24, 1966, this had been a proletarian revolution without a Marxist political party in which the masses were the real masters. The system was accepted for the Cultural Revolution in Article 9 of the 16 point decision of August 8, 1966.

with the peasants" and "carry on Mao's revolution" there; in other words, they were to become rural workers for an indefinite time. Though officially their exile to the countryside was covered by the veneer of enthusiastic acceptance of their fate, the disappointment and alienation that followed must have concerned Mao and the leadership in Peking.

Yet the structure emerging from the ninth party congress, called under the slogan of unity, seemed to guarantee not only the immediate reestablishment of the order and authority urgently needed in the face of a growing Soviet military threat across the northern border, but also a viable system of collective leadership for the succession after Mao's death.

Lin's preeminence was short-lived. He lost his life in September, 1971, after he had been accused by Mao first of having over-reached himself and eventually of conspiracy and treason. Lin Piao was allegedly killed in a plane crash in Mongolia on a flight to Soviet territory and his faction in Peking was purged. The question of the successorship was raised again. Apparently, the purge of Lin Piao, carried out with the help of other factions loyal to Mao and (no doubt) the secret police, was only a surface manifestation of a basic change in the post-Cultural Revolution power structure that deeply affected the Chinese political order.

Chou En-lai gained the immediate advantage as the military element weakened. During the period leading up to Lin's purge, both domestic and foreign policy were recharted under Chou's direction. The new policy, clearly affected by the growing Soviet military and political threat, led to the normalization of relations with the United States, to the entrance of the People's Republic into the United Nations, and to United States President Richard Nixon's visit to Peking. If Mao Tse-tung can be assumed to have charted this policy, who could better implement it than the suave, efficient and experienced Chou En-lai? As Lin Piao was essential for the Cultural Revolution, Chou was the man for the post-Revolutionary course. But once the purpose of this policy was accomplished—the immediate threat of the Soviet Union countered, China's international position strengthened, and her domestic economy improved—it may have occurred to Mao again to shift course and return to his original revolutionary goal, a Maoist system for China. How else could one explain the new clamor for the radical goals of the Cultural Revolution and the attacks that sprang up from the stronghold of the Maoist faction in Shanghai against unnamed reactionaries among the Chinese leadership.

Shanghai was where Mao started the Cultural Revolution when he retreated from Peking in 1965. Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, who came from the theater world of Shanghai, had sponsored her protégées, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan; these three

then became the chief leaders of what is generally referred to as the Maoist left. During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards and the so-called revolutionary rebels were the advance force of this radical left. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, after the Red Guards were dispersed, the Maoist left retained its power base in Shanghai and (as events were to prove) in other major industrial centers of China. As the largest and most important industrial and commercial city in China, Shanghai did not provide a setting for simple military dominance. Indeed, the Maoist leadership based its power on labor organizations within the city; and it was in Shanghai that Mao had attempted to introduce, during the Cultural Revolution, his system of mass rule under the slogan of the Paris Commune of 1871. Though this attempt failed, Shanghai remained a stronghold for Mao's radical supporters, even after the revolutionary left had been removed nationwide from positions of influence on the revolutionary committees.

After the fall of Lin Piao, the two remaining factions, the bureaucracy under Chou En-lai and the Maoist revolutionaries under Chiang Ching, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan, could be expected to vie for power. With Lin's fall, the outstanding military figure had been removed and a military take-over seemed out of the question for the time being at least. The complement of military leaders remained, however, in key positions in the center and in the regions, and could be expected to retain a decisive role in tipping the scale of any power struggle among the other two factions.

In such a potential contention for power, Chou had several advantages. In restructuring the local and regional administrations, Chou had played a decisive role in arranging compromises, picking candidates, and protecting some military leaders against Red Guard attacks. He had also rehabilitated a number of former party leaders, purged during the Cultural Revolution, who therefore could be expected to support him. The very success of Chou's economic and foreign policy, even though it may have been administered under Mao's direction, was in Chou's favor. Many observers thought that this new course in Peking's policy would survive Mao, and possibly Chou himself.

But did the new course really represent a basic change in policy goals? Had Mao been swayed from his ultimate purpose, revealed first in the Great Leap Forward in 1958, and more clearly in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? Was it possible to bring the third faction, the Maoist left, back into power? The events of the last year indeed can be seen as a determined effort in that direction, carried on in a discernible broadly conceived move which can only be directed from the top—and hardly by anybody but Mao himself.

Beginning in the fall of 1973, a new journal published in Shanghai under the title *Study and Criticism*, under a Mao masthead, began to express the new Maoist line echoed by a Maoist professor in Canton. Earlier, Maoist student voices had been raised in Mukden, and then in other Chinese cities, and eventually throughout the country. The new major theme of the drive, first expressed in the summer of 1973, was an attack against Confucius, the founder of the philosophical and ethical system on which Chinese society and state were based for 2000 years of imperial history.

The use of historical arguments as a weapon in political battles is not new in Chinese Communist history. The Cultural Revolution itself is a prime example of this form of attack by proxy, under which the true identity of the object is revealed only when the victim has been brought down. The sudden attack against Confucius therefore immediately raised the question of the identity of the real target—all the more so since in previous Chinese Communist characterizations, even by Mao, the ancient sage had not been altogether condemned. Now Confucius became the prototype of a reactionary and a revisionist, a man who, in his time, had attempted to turn the clock back and to stand against inevitable historical progress.

Confucius lived in the period of Chinese history—the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.—which, in the Communist doctrinal interpretation of a unilinear course of all human history, marked the transition from alleged “slavery” to alleged “feudalism.” Confucius was therefore attacked as a reactionary, “the thinker who stubbornly defends the system of slavery,” who had desperately opposed the incoming “feudalism” of the time. Setting aside the argument about doctrine and the historical role of Confucius, the attacks were important because, by implication, they could be interpreted as attacks against a whole field of policies (in the economy, in politics, in education, in the rehabilitation of cadres, and indeed in foreign policy) that resembled the policies initiated by Chou En-lai in his new post-Cultural Revolution and post-Lin Piao role. To identify the target further, there were specific hints at the present-day culprit; when the Duke of Chou, highly praised by Confucius, was singled out for attack, it was striking that his name happened to be the same as that of Chou En-lai. That this use of the similarity of names was no accident may be inferred from the fact that when the Shanghai article was eventually reprinted in the *People's Daily* in Peking, the reference to the Duke of Chou, together with some other embarrassing parallels to the present, were omitted from the reprinted text.

While this new Maoist ferment was taking hold, the tenth party congress was called in Peking. Since the congress met in utter secrecy and lasted only four days, the problems it dealt with can only be conjectured.

The tenor of the statements issued by the congress clearly showed the shift towards the left, as demonstrated by the reports of Chou En-lai and of a new member of the Politburo, Wang Hung-wen.

Wang Hung-wen had been a fast-rising star within the Shanghai group; he had gained his spurs by the organization of Maoist labor units in Shanghai factories. Later, he traveled frequently between Peking and Shanghai to provide contact and transmit orders between the Maoist leadership in Peking and the Shanghai base. At the tenth congress, he was elected to the third ranking position in the Politburo, listed after Mao and Chou. Wang reported on the new party constitution, while Chou En-lai delivered the statement on the general situation.

The most obvious reason for a new party constitution was the need to delete the paragraph concerning Lin Piao. Otherwise, Wang stated, the essential stipulation of the ninth congress constitution dealing with the ideological and basic program and the basic line were retained. In other words, the Maoist character of the new party that emerged from the Cultural Revolution was not affected; only the successorship of Lin Piao was stricken. Indeed, the emphasis on the constitution as a revolutionary document remained, as did the stress on the need for revolutionary Maoist successors and the role of the “masses” in criticizing and supervising the party. The revolutionary spirit of the party was expressly emphasized in the constitution and in Wang's report. Cultural Revolutions were “to be carried out many times in the future”; in Mao's words, “great disorder across the land leads to great order and so once again every seven or eight years monsters and demons will jump out” and have to be defeated. There were “still a small number of cadres, especially some leading cadres, who will not tolerate differing views from the masses inside or outside the party,” an ominous threat to an unknown leader or leaders. A true Communist must “dare to go against the tide.” The voice of the radical left thus set the tone in the tenth party congress and the make-up of the new Politburo showed that the Maoists retained a dominant position in the party.

Chou's report to the party congress made it plain that, to avoid being attacked by the Maoist left, he felt it necessary to turn left himself. His report may have astonished those who, because of his recent moderate course in domestic and foreign policies, regarded Chou as a “moderate” or even “pragmatist.” Any knowledge of Chou En-lai's past and of his ability to shift to a winning side would have precluded such a surprise. The radical tone of Chou's speech indicated only the pressure to which he yielded and the seriousness of the new turn in the domestic power struggle.

Very little was said by Chou on the aspects of domestic and foreign policy that might have made up

the main body of his statement. Instead, struggle and revolution were Chou's theme. In this paean to revolution, all that Chou En-lai had to say about domestic and foreign policies was compressed into two paragraphs in which he noted that the economy was flourishing and that China had maintained her revolutionary friendship with fraternal socialist countries and genuine Marxist-Leninist parties, had established diplomatic relations with an increasing number of countries on the basis of the five principals of peaceful coexistence, and had broken through her isolation by joining the United Nations. The normalization policy with the United States was mentioned in one-half of a sentence: "... Sino-United States relations have been improved to some extent." On the other hand, Chou's defense of the normalization policy against any danger of being compared with "collusion" between the superpowers, the U.S.S.R. and the United States was ominous. Quoting Lenin, Chou spoke of the difference between two types of compromise: "One must learn to distinguish between a man who gives the bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives bandits money and firearms in order to share in the loot."

For the rest, Chou sounded almost more Maoist than the Maoists, maligning Lin Piao as a "bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor," and attacking the Soviet Union. He extolled Mao and supported the Maoist revolution in literature and art, in education and in public health—fields in which Chou's own measures had apparently been in conflict earlier. The only special note that could perhaps be discovered in Chou's report was his admonition to party members to study the Marxist classics conscientiously in order to have a better grasp of the basic theories of Marxism, in connection, of course, with an understanding of Chairman Mao's inheritance and development of Marxism-Leninism.

However, Chou did not escape the danger of being the target of the anti-Confucius drive by joining the chorus praising continued revolution. Chou had to find another target. The new target was to be Lin Piao. That may explain why Chou had spent so much effort attacking Lin in his statement. The "small number of cadres, especially some leading cadres," mentioned by Wang Hung-wen and accused of not following the view of the masses, could be adherents of Lin Piao who had not yet been ferreted out. The anti-Confucian drive, linked with the anti-Lin Piao drive, became a major political movement taken up by the media and in mass meetings in Peking as well as in the provinces.

This deflection of the attack against Chou to another target, however, was apparently only partially successful. The veiled argument continued. The division in the leadership could be sensed from contra-

dictory editorials that appeared in leading newspapers in rapid succession. One day, the anti-Confucian, anti-Lin Piao movement was described as a violent struggle; another day, the same drive was a theoretical discussion. New accusations were made. A play written by a group in Shansi province had been performed at a festival in Peking with approval of the authorities who, in the last resort, must have included Chou En-lai. This play, "The Three Visits to the Peach Peak," described in abstruse terms the misdeeds of a commune which had sold another commune a sick horse that later died. The leader of the first commune went to great lengths to apologize and replaced the animal with a healthy one. In the symbolism of the play, there was supposedly hidden an implied attack against Mao's policy of the Great Leap Forward. Other allegations followed. In April, 1974, an article, originally printed in 1973, was republished in the *Red Flag*, describing the case of Minister Fan Sui of the state of Chin, who had given the wrong advice to his ruler to be friendly with far away countries and to challenge neighboring states. The minister had been advised to resign from his position, the obvious implication being that Chou En-lai should see that it was time for him to resign. Even the famous novel, *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, was drawn into the argument.

Two contradictory lines can be discerned in all the arguments that take place behind an ideological screen. One calls for unity and the other for struggle and violence. The call for unity had been stressed by Chou En-lai ever since he used the slogan of "seeking the common ground and reserving minor differences" at the Bandung Conference. On the other side, the leftists stressed the need for continuing struggle and "revolutionary violence" to bring about the new order of communism.

It is unthinkable that Mao Tse-tung should not be fully aware of this conflict in China, and there can be little question about where he stands. The whole emphasis on the Cultural Revolution, on its revival and continuation for a long time to come, appears to reflect Mao's purpose. Any retreat in domestic or foreign policy can, from that point of view, be only temporary; the relentless drive toward the Maoist goal must be resumed whenever temporary concessions have removed immediate dangers.

In any showdown between the Maoists, dominant in the party, and the Chou group, in control of the government administration, the support of the PLA will obviously be of crucial importance. In his role in reestablishing the administrative structure and in protecting military men against Red Guard attacks, Chou En-lai may well have obtained the support of crucial military commanders. The question is whether the Maoists, after the death of Mao, would be able to secure enough military support to gain the upper hand

in a power conflict. It was clearly not enough for Wang Hung-wen, who had never been in the PLA, to show himself in uniform wherever feasible. The question remained: who controlled the commanders?

In 1973, the problem of control over the PLA commanders was aggravated by the fact that the most important officers had become entrenched in their respective regions. Commanders like Ch'en Hsi-lien, in Mukden, or Hsu Shih-yu, in Nanking, had not been involved in the power struggle over Lin Piao. Indeed, they belong to different military factions, the former Third and Second Field Armies, who remained in their regional positions when Lin Piao's adherents of the former Fourth Field Army were purged in Peking and, later, in some provincial strongholds. What made them so powerful was not only the long time they had spent in their regional centers, but the combination of political and military power in their regional command. To break this entrenched power, an ingenious move was made by shifting regional commanders of eight of the eleven military regions in December, 1973. The importance of this swap of commanders was at least two-fold. None of them was given the chairmanship of the revolutionary committees or the secretaryship of the party in their new locations, nor were the troops they had commanded moved with them. They were thus greatly reduced in power, deprived of their party and administrative authority. The danger of regionalism was thus reduced, if not eliminated. Less obvious, but perhaps even more significant, was the fact that military control over the regions of Maoist strength was ended. Shanghai, Canton, and Mukden were the three centers from which the anti-Confucian campaign and the implied revival of the Cultural Revolution had originated. Clearly, the move freed these Maoist centers of regional military-political power.

One other major political event was the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping. Teng was the number two target of the Cultural Revolution, next to Liu Shao-chi, the chief revisionist culprit and alleged follower of the capitalist tradition. Before his purge, Teng was an experienced administrator who held many important positions in the party and administration of the People's Republic. He also had been a political commissar of the former Second Field Army and he may have retained his contacts with old colleagues. If one man could replace the irreplaceable Chou En-lai, it was Teng Hsiao-ping. The question was, who brought Teng back? Did Chou En-lai persuade Mao Tse-tung to rehabilitate Teng or did Mao select him as a replacement for Chou En-lai, planning to force Chou into retirement? Were it not for the continuing implied attacks against Chou En-lai, one could assume the former, but Chou's role has clearly declined under fire and Teng's selection is suspect.

During the past year, for the first time, Chou has

been absent from many major functions which used to be under his personal supervision. And when Chou was present he did not play the star role. The official excuse was that because of his age, 76, Chou En-lai was ill, and was therefore no longer able to assume all his responsibilities. Of course, Chou En-lai may well have been ill; there were rumors of a heart attack. In fact, illness may save Chou from being retired in other ways; there have been accusations—supposedly against Lin Piao—that he “feigned illness” to avoid attack; and some of Chou's disappearances imply diminutions of prestige that appear unnecessary from the point of view of lessening the burden for an old man.

One could assume that Chou's semi-retirement and the new appointments, especially that of Teng, could all serve the purpose of a continued efficient administrative system, and that Chou and Mao are continuing to work closely together. But in that case why the political arguments? Why the new upheavals, the ideological debate, the tug of doctrinal war, the “mini-Cultural Revolution?” Chou has obviously served a purpose, but he is not the man to carry on Mao's revolution.

How this revolution will be institutionalized is still unclear. The question of China's future has not yet been answered. Can Mao's continued revolution be reintroduced 10, 20, or 30 times, to a utopian ending? Will the cult survive the leader? Or is there a possibility that orthodox Marxism-Leninism will follow? And would that lead to renewed cooperation with the Soviet Union? Is there a third way, a nationalist Chinese course, so often mentioned by foreign observers? Is Chinese nationalism possible without some aspect of the Confucian tradition?

It may well be that Mao is really striving to separate China from this cultural tradition, and that anti-Confucianism is his attempt to eradicate this Chinese past and to put his own cult in its place. Unless one assumes that Mao's utopia is attainable, China will return either to the orthodoxy of communism or to a new form of nationalism under a new type of leadership. The factor of exhaustion in China, after all the turmoil of the last decade, may provide an opportunity for a strong leader—but will there be a strong leader? The future remains uncertain, but there is an open revolutionary situation in China today.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON CHINA

THE MAOIST EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION.

By THEODORE HSI-EN-CHEN. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 295 pages, appendices and index, \$20.00.)

Theodore Chen explains the difficulties in making a critical evaluation of Maoist education, saying that the attempt is "subject to grave hazards and runs the risk of arousing emotional reactions and contentious arguments. The tendency to take polarized positions makes it difficult to see the achievements and the shortcomings in the proper perspective. There is also a tendency to treat any criticism or endorsement of the educational program as rejection or acceptance of Mao's role in other aspects of the Chinese revolution. It should be possible . . . to recognize Mao's signal success in elevating China's position in international relations . . . and be critical of his educational revolution. It should be . . . possible to endorse Mao's educational goals but question the methods . . . used . . . to the attainment of the goals."

Mao himself has said that the success of the Communist revolution depends upon the millions of dedicated Chinese, young and old; thus education is a major concern of the Communist state.

Chen outlines in great detail the history and conduct of schools and colleges. He offers an overview of Chinese education and an effective summary of the educational system. His lengthy appendices offer translations from Chinese writings during this period and add greatly to the value of the work for the scholar.

O.E.S.

BRITAIN AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-1939. By BRADFORD A. LEE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973. 318 pages, biographical note and index, \$10.00.)

Based on unpublished records of the British Foreign Office, Bradford Lee's book reveals interesting information about the beginning of the war in the Pacific and about the start of Britain's decline as an Asian power.

THE POLITICS OF CHINESE COMMUNISM: KIANGSI UNDER THE SOVIETS. By IL-PYONG J. KIM. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 232 pages, glossary, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

Mr. Kim explores the Communist movement of 1931-1934 in the Chinese-Soviet Republic in

Kiangsi province where, he believes, the political system of China today had its origins.

THE INVISIBLE CHINA. By GARTH ALEXANDER. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. 264 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$7.95.)

Garth Alexander details the major influence the 15 million Chinese people living in countries other than China have on the politics of Southeast Asia.

CHINA'S POLICY IN AFRICA, 1958-1971. By ALABA OGUNSANWO. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974. 310 pages, appendices and index, \$19.50.)

Dr. Ogunsanwo details the development of Chinese policy in Africa and places his study in the context of the United States-Soviet struggle during the same 1958-1971 period.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN CHINA. By CHARLES BETTELHEIM. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 128 pages, \$6.95.)

Charles Bettelheim contends in this book that the Cultural Revolution in China began the process of transforming an age-old pattern of division of labor into a newer pattern in which workers are also drawn into the tasks of management.

RADICALS AND RADICAL IDEOLOGY IN CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By PARRIS H. CHANG. (New York: Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, 1973. 103 pages, appendix, \$1.00.)

Parris Chang traces the developments leading up to the 1966 revolution, describes the political machinations of the movement, and profiles the major participants.

WORLD COMMUNISM: A HANDBOOK 1918-1965. Edited by WITOLD S. SWORAKOWSKI. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 576 pages, appendix and index, \$25.00.)

This handy reference guide provides a concise historical essay on every Communist party and key Communist front organization. The essays are written by specialists, with an eye for essential detail. The bibliographies at the end of each article enhance the volume's overall usefulness.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
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CHINA'S MILITARY

(Continued from page 105)

smoothness with which Peking has carried out the reshuffle testifies to its resourcefulness and leadership skill. Clearly, the party leadership holds several trump cards.

First of all, the central leadership still wields the power of appointment and dismissal. A system of *nomenklatura* enables the center to dismiss and shift recalcitrant officials, civilian and military alike, and to effect periodic shake-ups and reorganizations. This is a formidable weapon, for civilian and military leaders' authority to command obedience and to allocate resources stems largely from their possession of leadership positions in the party, government or military hierarchies; once they lose these positions, their source of power is preempted.

Furthermore, the party leadership, through the Military Affairs Commission (MAC—Mao being its head), controls troops and, when necessary, can use military force to achieve political ends. During the Wuhan mutiny in July, 1967, Peking actually dispatched superior forces to overpower the rebellion of the Wuhan PLA leaders. Various regional PLA headquarters also control military units, but the MAC can relieve the command of such units from the local PLA authorities and place them under central control, as it actually did on many occasions during the Cultural Revolution. There is no evidence that the party leadership ever hinted at any use of military power against regional leaders to forestall opposition in the recent shake-up; this was perhaps unnecessary, because the regional PLA leaders seem well aware of Peking's capability; thus they have muttered in discontent but have offered no overt resistance.

In addition, Mao has resorted to divide-and-rule tactics to create and foster rivalry among PLA leaders in order to maximize control. Lin Piao, who knew this only too well, exposed the manipulation of Mao and his inner circles in these words:

Today, they use this group to attack that group; tomorrow they use that group to attack this group. . . . They manufacture contradictions and splits in order to attain their goals of divide and rule, destroying each group in turn and maintaining their ruling position.¹⁴

In fact, Mao himself admitted the tactic when he spoke of his maneuver to "mix in sand."

The employment of divide-and-rule tactics was facilitated by the existence of cliques and factions in the PLA and in the party leadership. Mao knew intimately the personal ties and rivalries of Chinese leaders who historically belonged to different field

army groups and was aware of strong antagonism toward Lin Piao among many top leaders who suffered from his ill treatment and his encroachment into their "fiefs" during the GPCR. Thus he had little difficulty in mobilizing the support of the non-Lin Piao factions to overpower Lin and his Fourth Field Army group in the showdown that took place in 1970–1971. In line with this approach, since the fall of 1971 Mao has assigned many PLA officers who did not belong to Lin's faction to various PLA units, in order to strengthen the anti-Lin forces or to dilute the control of the pro-Lin forces. The appointment of Yang Yung (a First Field Army man) as commander of the Sinkiang MR to replace Ling Shu-chin (a Lin Piao follower) and the transfer of Hsu Shih-yu (a Third Field Army leader) to the Canton MR, the stronghold of Lin's Fourth Field Army group, as its new commander, are two examples of this strategy.

Whereas Mao was allied with the leaders of the Fourth Field Army group during the GPCR, since Lin's demise, he has courted and co-opted the leaders of the Second Field Army group and, to a lesser extent, those of the Third Field Army group. Thus, the rehabilitation of many party officials who have close ties to these groups, like Teng Hsiao-p'ing (ex-General Secretary of the party) of the Second Field Army and T'an Chen-lin (ex-Politburo member) of the Third Field Army group (who were disgraced during the GPCR) seems politically motivated, and not entirely due to their successful "remoulding." The sudden rise of the political star of Teng Hsiao-p'ing since the beginning of 1974 (he was elevated to the Politburo in January, led a Chinese delegation to attend a special session of the United Nations in New York in April and has since received visiting foreign dignitaries in the company of Mao) may be another indication of Mao's co-optation maneuver. Reportedly, Teng played a vital role in arranging the major reshuffle of regional PLA leaders in December, 1973.

With respect to organizational matters, mechanisms of party control over the PLA (which were impaired or weakened by the disruption during the GPCR) have been gradually reinstituted or strengthened. At the central level, for instance, the general political department (which is the party's watch-dog body within the PLA and carries out political indoctrination and control on behalf of the party leadership) was revived in 1969–1970, after it had been closed down in the summer of 1967. At the levels of regional and provincial PLA headquarters, the system of political commissar, through which the civilian party cadres enforce political control over local PLA authorities, has also been reinforced.

It is true that the system of political commissar was never abolished during the Cultural Revolution. However, the purges during the GPCR did remove

¹⁴ Quoted in "Chung-fa 1972 (4)," *Chinese Law and Government*, p. 54.

many top regional/provincial party officials who were concurrently senior political commissars. Those political commissars who survived or were newly appointed during the GPCR were military men and tended to articulate military viewpoints; hence party control was much less effective. Since Lin Piao's downfall, Peking has gradually reinstituted the civilian control system by appointing civilian party cadres to the posts of senior political commissars.

If the party leadership has been able to elicit compliance from the PLA and to reassert party control, it is perhaps because it still holds the final trump card—Mao Tse-tung, the supreme leader. There is no question that Mao possesses enormous personal authority, and his charismatic qualities inspire the deep loyalty of many Chinese Communists. Furthermore, he has become an institution above the party; he is the source of legitimacy and he controls the legitimate political symbols of the regime. Other leaders, civilian and military alike, can only exercise power by claiming to conform to the standards he has set. When necessary, he can (and did) redefine the standards and change the “rules of the game,” thereby politically undermining those “waving the red flags to oppose the Red Flag.” As the linchpin of the Chinese political system, Mao, at 80, is precariously holding the pieces together.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since the turn of the year, Maoist leadership efforts to push the PLA “back to the barracks” and to subordinate the PLA under tight party control have been intensified. These efforts have found clear expressions in the ideological campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius and to glorify Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (first Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, 259–210 B.C.) who unified China by destroying all feudal kingdoms and established the first Chinese empire. Moreover, by means of the reshuffle, the Peking leadership has attempted to break the political and territorial bases of power of the regional PLA leaders. To intimidate

these military strongmen, Peking has subjected them to political attack and has accused them of being co-conspirators and the accomplices of Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi.¹⁵

Without question, the Lin Piao affair traumatically shocked the polity and its adverse effects are still felt today. In the wake of Lin's demise, political confusion, cynicism, and animosity have been widespread among the cadres, and they have openly expressed doubts about Peking's explanation of the Lin Piao affair. For example, some cadres challenged Peking's story, contending that Lin Piao and his top aides “had reached so high positions and wielded so great power, why should they be discontented?”¹⁶ Peking's explanation of the Lin affair as a struggle between the two classes (capitalist and proletarian) or two lines and as Lin's attempt to restore capitalism in China is even less convincing. Cadres have implicitly questioned Peking's credibility by conceding their bewilderment and inability to comprehend the “struggle between the two lines.”¹⁷ The subsequent drive by the Maoist leadership to purge Lin's alleged co-conspirators and accomplices has further polarized and demoralized the cadres.

Almost three years after the downfall of Lin and his top aides, quite a few high command posts remain unfilled. As of this writing (June, 1974), China is without a Head of State, and the posts of Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff and several other key military posts in the central PLA headquarters are still vacant—a highly abnormal situation. Although the leadership functions of these posts have been performed—performed by those who do not carry the formal titles—the fact that these positions have not been filled after such a long delay indicates leadership dissension. Apparently, the leadership is deeply divided and its various factions are unable to agree upon the choices to fill the “slots.”

Rivalries and divisions in the Chinese leadership—between the radicals and the moderate-conservatives, between civilians and PLA men, and among PLA factions—will most likely outlast Mao. Without an arbiter of Mao's stature, the future Chinese leadership will experience more conflict. Under such circumstances, the PLA may again be thrust into the political arena; various leaders may enlist the support of the PLA or some of its leaders to resolve the political deadlock (just as Mao did on the eve of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), thereby reopening the floodgate to the People's Liberation Army's intervention in politics.

All this being said, one should add that the political situation in China today remains fluid. Further changes in leadership, in the political roles of the PLA, and in the party-PLA relationship are certain to take place after, if not before, the departure of Chairman Mao.

¹⁵ Several PLA leaders appear to be in deep political trouble. Han Hsien-chu, former commander of Fuchow MR and first party secretary of Fukien province and new commander of Lanchow MR after January, 1974, has been denounced for “supporting” and “approving” the publication in Fukien in 1971 of a pamphlet which extolled Lin Piao; see *The People's Daily*, April 7, 1974, p. 2.

Hsieh Chen-hua, first secretary of Shansi and commander of the Shansi military district, has been criticized and held responsible for a drama, “Three Visits to Taofeng,” produced by the Shansi provincial cultural group which allegedly attacks Mao's policies and seeks to vindicate the disgraced Liu Shao-chi. See *ibid.*, February 28, 1974. There are also reports of attacks on PLA leaders in big-character posters in many other places.

¹⁶ *Red Flag*, no. 13, December 4, 1971, p. 22.

¹⁷ *Radio Canton*, January 21, 1972, and *Radio Tsinan*, December 2, 1971.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD

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tional Chinese foreign policy—was borrowed by the Nixon administration as an unstated central theme in its relations with the Communist powers.

The announcement in July, 1971, that Henry Kissinger had been to Peking to talk to China's leaders, and that the President would soon be visiting China, was a clear signal that the American policy of isolation and containment had finally ended. No longer would the United States pressure third world countries to embargo trade or to withhold diplomatic recognition from the People's Republic. "Normalization of relations," in the words of the Shanghai communiqué, published seven months later, was the American objective. Many third world governments had been more friendly to the People's Republic of China in recent years; the American policy added further impetus to change.

Ten new third world countries established diplomatic relations with China in the latter half of 1971 alone.¹⁸ In 1972, 12 more agreed to exchange diplomatic missions with Peking,¹⁹ and by the end of the year, for the first time since 1949, a majority of the independent states of the third world had established formal government-to-government ties with China. In October, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly, after 22 years of avoiding political reality, voted to recognize the government of China and to expel the government of Taiwan from China's seat.

Though it is too early to be certain, events of the past four years may constitute a threshold in China's relations with the third world. As we have seen, the third world countries enjoy a wide range of economic, cultural, and political diversity. Certainly, no particular issue or set of issues will be relevant for all of them; problems that separate the developing countries often make for conflicts among them. Yet many of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America share a sense of deprivation and exploitation at the hands of the rich countries, and all of them would like to improve their lot. They are responsive to the ex-

ample of a self-reliant China and inspired by China's courage in confronting the world's great nuclear powers.

Press reports at the time of the special United Nations session on raw materials and development at which Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke illustrate dimensions of the contrasts between the world's rich and poor. *The New York Times*, for example, reported in a background article that 70 percent of the world's population received 30 percent of the world's income.²⁰ Another account quoted Algerian President Boumedienne's speech to the special session in which he asserted that the wheat requirements of the starving people of the drought-stricken regions of Africa could be met with five percent of the wheat that the "developed" countries use each year to feed their cattle.²¹ Contrasts between the standard of living in China and that in America are striking: Professor Jean Mayer of Harvard was quoted as calculating that: "The same amount of food that is feeding 210 million Americans would feed 1.5 billion Chinese on an average Chinese diet."²² Material differences as profound as these between countries will have a marked and persistent influence on world politics for years to come.

Ten years ago, Chinese policy statements were devoted to the discussion of revolution in the third world and the advantages of the Maoist revolutionary model.²³ Today, Chinese discussion emphasizes the importance of national self-reliance, control of natural resources, and the political independence of non-Communist states from neo-colonial superpower designs. Although the Chinese still support revolutions, especially in the Portuguese colonies and against the white-racist regimes of southern Africa, Chinese third world policy is focused on cooperating with non-Communist governments on a basis of mutual benefit. Since 1970, China has become a major donor of technical and economic assistance to third world governments,²⁴ and interest among developing countries in the Chinese economic development experience has grown apace.

The world may not be so simple as the Chinese three-world concept implies, particularly when China herself seems to depend on the United States for defense against the Soviets. China is also fundamentally different from most third world countries; she enjoys a cultural heritage, endowment in resources, and military power that they will never know. Yet there are advantages for China in building cooperative relationships with the "have-nots" against the "haves," and there are potential benefits for the developing countries in accepting China as their champion. As for the industrialized countries dependent upon the third world for raw materials, the People's Republic seems as determined to fashion a third world economic alliance against them in the present as the superpowers were to build military alliances around China in the past.

¹⁸ Sierra Leone, Turkey, Iran, Tunisia, Burundi, Peru, Lebanon, Rwanda, Senegal, and Cyprus.

¹⁹ Mexico, Argentina, Ghana, Mauritius, Guyana, Togo, Maldives, Malagasy Republic, Jamaica, Zaire, Chad, and Dahomey.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, April 10, 1974, p. 13.

²¹ Quoted in a *New York Review of Books* article by Emma Rothschild, May 16, 1974, p. 16.

²² Quoted in an Anthony Lewis column in *The New York Times*, April 22, 1974, p. 35.

²³ See Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *op. cit.*

²⁴ For the most recent figures on China's foreign aid commitments to the third world, see Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1972" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August, 1973).

CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

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To prevent the food ration from fluctuating with the grain harvest and as a precaution against the possibility of war, grain inventories are being built up at all levels, and the stocking is supported by a costly wheat import program; most important, the level of expectations is kept down by a moral philosophy—strictly enforced—that makes the enjoyment of simple pleasures a virtue next only to love for the Chairman.

An emphasis on growth is there, of course. But it is less obsessive than in other socialist countries. Growth of output, like everything else, is subservient to a particular vision of society, a vision molded in the ascetic guerrilla days of the Long March and Yanan. Whenever the too rapid or too "incorrect" accumulation of material goods threatens the ideal blueprint, it is traded against rectification upheavals. Cultural revolutions are not very good for the gross national product but, Mao believes, they are excellent for the soul. In China, there is great pride in material progress, but there is also a strongly held conviction that wealth corrupts. Mao's successors, whoever they may be (and that in itself is a crucial question), will have to address themselves to this potentially explosive contradiction between material advancement and the embourgeoisement of the proletariat.

CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

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is again economic. Japan has one of the world's most powerful industrial plants, but she has to import almost all of her industrial raw materials. The country has been hard hit by a series of developments in the wake of the "Nixon shock" of 1971 (the most recent setback resulted from the increase in petroleum prices that came out of the Arab-Israeli War). Now Japan is experiencing a serious recession, with acute inflation and a virtual cessation of economic growth. Despite the relative flourishing of Sino-Japanese trade, in 1973 there was a big American deficit in Japan's much more important trade with the United States, and the Nixon administration was in no more of a conciliatory mood in 1973 than it had been in 1971. Assistant Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, on a visit to Tokyo in January, 1974, warned the Japanese not to mount a sales drive in the American market to earn foreign exchange with which to meet the increased costs of oil imports. It was apparent that Japan could not expect substantial assistance from the United States for the resolution of her critical economic problems.

¹⁴ Theodore Shabad, *The New York Times*, March 18, 1974.

Tokyo has consequently shown a heightened interest in the economic opportunities offered by Moscow. Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka visited Moscow in October, 1973, with the aim of achieving a peace treaty, and—probably in part by reason of the political climate created by China's public support for the venture—the return of the four southernmost Kuriles. The Soviets balked, and Tanaka left without a political settlement. The final communiqué committed both sides to economic cooperation, the promotion of contracts between Japanese companies and Soviet organizations, and the furthering of expeditious implementation of such contracts. But the Soviet side displayed a hard stance with respect to oil supplies and oil prices, and it was evident that Moscow knew that world developments had strengthened its bargaining position.

In 1970, for the first time jointly with the U.S.S.R., Japan had undertaken an economic project in Siberia based upon the working principle of "economic cooperation." And, in 1971, Japan had signed a new agreement with Moscow providing for a considerable increase of regular commercial exchanges between the two countries. Japan had a strong operating base on which to build—if she would forego the effort to exact political concessions in return for the normal sale of goods. And on March 9, 1974, in Moscow, the two sides initialed an agreement providing for Japanese assistance in the development of a vast coal basin in southern Yakutia. In exchange for the deliveries of "millions of tons of high-grade coking coal for Japan's iron and steel industry" (it was understood), the agreement provided that the Japanese side would supply mining equipment and assist in the construction of railways and towns.¹⁴

Final agreement with regard to that project was reached in April, 1974. At the time, a team of Soviet specialists was in Tokyo for negotiations regarding five other projects which would probably require the Japanese to provide over \$7 billion in credits and equipment. However, it appeared to be significant that, on May 27, Valentin D. Shashin, the Soviet oil minister, speaking to foreign newsmen in Moscow, indicated that one of the projects, providing for the construction of a trans-Siberian pipeline for the transport of oil from the rich Tyumen field to the Soviet Pacific coast, with Japan to receive big deliveries of petroleum in payment, was a dead issue. The minister's statement may have been a bargaining gambit; or, conceivably, Tokyo had waited too long.

The U.S.S.R.'s bargaining position has suddenly improved substantially, and it may now be demanding markedly higher prices, perhaps in political as well as economic terms, in connection with negotiations for projects of "economic cooperation" with Japanese enterprises. In any event, it is to be anticipated that, because of Japan's pressing needs, Japa-

nese business enterprises will in the future be found participating in an increasing number of economic projects in Siberia—if possibly enjoying a smaller profit margin than before.¹⁵ Such Soviet-Japanese collaboration will inevitably have its influence on the power position of China—and of Japan.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

There has been little movement in Sino-American relations since the exchange of liaison missions. It has been reported that the small American military forces in Taiwan (some 5,000 men) are to be withdrawn, but the American treaty of alliance with Taiwan remains in being, and as long as it is in force the United States remains committed to the defense of Taiwan and the Nationalist regime. American *de jure* recognition of the Peking regime is not feasible so long as the treaty tie with Taiwan is maintained; thus closer diplomatic relations with China are not now expected. Relatively speaking, trade between the United States and China is flourishing: the turnover is expected to reach the \$1.25-billion mark in 1974. But that trade is lopsided, with American exports amounting to ten times the imports from China, reflecting in part China's need for agricultural products and in part the circumstance that, like the U.S.S.R., China does not enjoy most-favored-nation tariff treatment. But trade can continue, in a fashion, even if the political climate does not improve. (In May, Peking signed the usual annual trade agreement with Moscow.) Peking's policy decisions of August, 1973, are in operation.

There are multiple reasons for Peking's policy shift with respect to the United States. Apart from the Taiwan issue, the Indochina matter remains unresolved—regardless of the solemn engagements undertaken at the beginning of 1973. The American military presence in Asia, except for the troops that were fighting in Vietnam, has been reduced only slightly. If the 35,000 American troops in Thailand are scheduled to be reduced to 27,000 by the end of 1974, there are still strong United States forces garrisoned in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines; and the powerful United States Seventh Fleet counts 16,000 men. The complex of American military alliances and military bases surrounding China on the sea side continues to be a potential threat to China's "national security."

But the critical element in the equation is probably the all-too-evident weakening of the American strategic position as leader of the "free world"—or, as Chairman Mao would say, the capitalist world. Economic troubles afflict that world sector and foster

social unrest. Leaderships are being weakened. The North Atlantic community as a whole is in political disarray and displays far too little coordination to merit being termed a "partnership." This circumstance is of immediate concern to Peking, which has been looking to NATO, and to the United States in particular, to divert Soviet power from Asia. Finally, the United States as the richest and also most voracious of the world's economic entities is the natural target of needy Third World countries.

Chou En-lai made an observation in his report to the tenth party congress that has application to Sino-American relations. In his condemnation of Moscow, he said:

We should point out here that necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism. Lenin put it well: "There are compromises and compromises."

By Chou's way of thinking, the "necessary" compromise of 1971–1972 with the "imperialist" United States was a matter of expediency; there was no thought that such a compromise represented a permanent commitment.

It is uncertain what course Peking's foreign policy will take after Mao's death. But the present course, consolidating the isolation of the Middle Kingdom, does not promise to bring to China the preeminent position in world affairs of which the present leadership dreams. It is therefore to be assumed that, after the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the foreign policy line of the People's Republic of China will shift yet another time.

CHINESE SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

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was maintained. The family as a social institution has not vanished.

Nor did the Chinese intellectuals bow to the ruler. In 1957, as an acid test of thought reform, Mao openly invited Chinese intellectuals to speak their minds. After years of suppression and humiliation, the intellectuals responded with a storm of public criticism. In May, 1957, at the climax of the national cacophony, more than one-third of the 100,000 intellectuals in China openly denounced the regime. Their charges included party dictatorship, police-state policies, and lopsided foreign policy. Resentment by the intellectuals was so deep-seated that even those in the China People's University, the highest institution for training Marxist social scientists, attacked the regime. These accusations shook the foundation of the Communist government like a tornado and indicated that thought reform has not

¹⁵ See, for background in this connection, Hayato Ishikawa, "Siberian Development Projects Begin to Move Toward Reality," *The Japan Economic Review*, April 15, 1974, p. 6.

been really as effective as the Communist leaders expected.²⁴

Intellectual rebellion has never ceased. In 1962–1964, in the wake of the collapse of the Great Leap, many top intellectuals in the party advocated the theory of “class reconciliation” in opposition to Mao’s view that class struggle must be carried out to the end. Among Mao’s opponents were eminent philosophers, theoreticians, novelists, and playwrights, many of whom had been party members for 20 to 30 years.²⁵ Once again, the Chinese intellectuals identified themselves with Confucianism instead of Marxism and Maoism.

It was against this background that Mao decided that only permanent revolution could keep China on the track toward socialism. As Mao told an Albanian delegation seven years ago: “The building of socialism cannot be accomplished in one, two, three, or four Cultural Revolutions. There must be many others.”²⁶ More recently, he even forecast that great disorder will occur every seven or eight years.²⁷

Chinese society today is at a crossroad. Apparently, the Communist leaders intend to force the Chinese people to make a choice between wholeheartedly following Mao Tse-tung’s Thoughts or retaining Confucianism as a way of life. From 1967 to 1969, the two authoritative Communist newspapers, the *People’s Daily* and the *Liberation Army Daily*, and the party organ, the *Red Flag*, continued to attack Confucius, Confucianism and the pro-Confucianists periodically. They believed that unless Confucian influences were completely eradicated, Mao’s Thoughts would never prevail. Despite these continuous campaigns, no one can predict with any confidence how long Maoism can survive the death of its creator.

The basic weakness of Maoism stems from its dogmatic reliance on the outmoded experiences of the guerrilla days of the Yen-an era for answers to the problems facing the post-revolutionary state. It also contradicts the basic instinct of human nature. Under

the concept of permanent revolution, there is no security for any member of the society. The ordinary individual in China—the worker, peasant, student, or cadre member—can no longer visualize his future with any certainty or plot a rational course toward it. The continuous upheavals Mao promised to introduce have made it virtually impossible for an individual to plan on the basis of past experience. Within a short span of six years (1966–1971), two of the “closest comrades-at-arms” of the Chairman who were his chosen heirs apparent were purged and condemned as “traitors, reactionaries, special agents of Kuomintang,” and “Confucius followers.” Even the most naive people begin to question the correctness of Mao’s Thoughts. In view of widespread apathy and indifference toward the current campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius,²⁸ it appears that Mao’s desperate effort to steer society toward his radical ideas after his death will prove to be fruitless.

Many experienced Western observers who traveled in China in recent years found an unchanged social current underneath an ostensibly puritan society. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese people cling to the essentials of Chinese traditions. They are still family bound, and they favor self-government. They measure social progress, not in terms of ideological purity, but in terms of their caches of grains and their possession of radio sets and sewing machines. As one American journalist noted: “The tendency toward embourgeoisement was more plainly visible in the Chinese countryside than the image of a new Chinese man.”²⁹ Mao tended toward this view in 1955 when he observed that the Chinese peasants have a “spontaneous tendency toward capitalism.”³⁰ Once the government loosens control, the winds of individualism and capitalism apparently will prevail.

The purged Chairman of China, Liu Shao-ch’i, had a clear understanding of this problem. After the catastrophic failure of the communization and the Great Leap in 1958–1959, Liu, like Lenin in 1919–1920, adopted a New Economic Policy, returning private plots to peasants, reopening the farm markets, and even fixing output quotas for peasant households. It was this “revisionist line” that helped to move Chinese agriculture away from a dead-end road. Despite the constant charges against Liu for revisionist crimes in recent years, the economic policies he advocated during the post-1961 period persist.³¹

In view of the general tendency to relax controls and increasingly to rely on material incentives in most Communist countries, one is inclined to predict that Chinese leaders after Mao will be strongly motivated to continue the present trend toward a relatively pragmatic, non-ideological approach to economic development. In the future, Chinese society may be shaped more by a combination of nationalistic priorities and pragmatic goals than by Mao’s utopian ideals.

²⁴ Chu-yuan Cheng, *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1966), pp. 257–259.

²⁵ Chu-yuan Cheng, “Power Struggle in Red China,” in *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), September, 1966, pp. 474–475.

²⁶ C. L. Sulzberger, “Permanent Revolution,” *The New York Times*, October 3, 1973.

²⁷ C. L. Sulzberger, “China Squares the Circle,” *The New York Times*, December 8, 1973.

²⁸ Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

²⁹ A number of recent pronouncements has indicated plainly that the new drive has not yet lived up to the expectations of its promoters. For instance, the Shensi provincial Revolutionary Committee admitted that problems of “understanding” and “attitude” had bedeviled the campaign. (See *The New York Times*, June 11, 1973.)

³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, “On the Question of Agricultural Cooperatives,” *People’s China*, no. 22 (November 1, 1955).

³¹ Chu-yuan Cheng, “The Root of China’s Cultural Revolution,” *Orbis*, vol. 11, no. 4 (1968), p. 1,178.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of July, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Cyprus Crisis

(See also *Greece*)

July 15—A Greek-led group of Cypriote army insurgents overthrows the government of Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus. Nikos Giorgiades Sampson, a Cypriote newspaper publisher, is named President of Cyprus by the rebels. 30 people are reported killed and over 100 injured in fighting in the capital city of Nicosia.

July 17—Archbishop Makarios flees from Cyprus and arrives in Great Britain to meet with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit also meets with Wilson and Callaghan.

The U.S. government begins negotiations with the new Cypriote leadership. The U.S. government claims that no decision has been made on diplomatic recognition.

July 18—The Greek government agrees to replace in stages the 650 Cypriote National Guard officers who were responsible for the coup. Turkey has been demanding the immediate and total withdrawal of all Greek officers involved.

July 19—The U.N. Security Council receives Archbishop Makarios as President of Cyprus. He appeals to the Council for aid, asking it to force Greece to remove the 650 Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard involved in the coup.

July 20—Turkey invades Cyprus, establishing a beachhead on the northern coast and opening a route inland to Nicosia.

In reaction to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Greece mobilizes her troops and moves them to the Greek border.

July 22—After working out the terms of a truce in the Security Council, the U.N. announces a cease-fire between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. Representatives of Greece and Turkey will meet in Geneva later this week, with Britain attending as a full participant.

Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit says that Turkish troops will remain on Cyprus.

Meeting in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Council urges Greek-Turkish talks. Both Greece and Turkey belong to NATO.

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asks for an increase in the 2,300-man U.N. peace-keeping

force on Cyprus. Britain, Australia and the U.S. support his request.

July 23—Self-proclaimed President of Cyprus Nikos Sampson resigns after a week in office and turns the presidency over to the president of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides.

The tentative cease-fire is interrupted by fighting between ethnic Greek and Turkish communities.

July 25—In Geneva, Turkish, Greek and British foreign ministers begin to discuss the Cyprus crisis.

July 26—In violation of the cease-fire, new fighting breaks out between Greek Cypriotes and Turkish forces still in Cyprus.

July 29—After some 31 hours of negotiation, the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain recess without reaching agreement on a cease-fire, because of the issue of withdrawing Turkish forces from Cyprus. It is reported that there are now about 20,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus. The U.N. plans to increase its peace-keeping force there to 5,000 in the coming weeks.

July 30—Greece, Turkey and Great Britain sign a new cease-fire agreement; Turkish forces will remain on Cyprus until an "acceptable" settlement is reached.

July 31—Greek Cypriotes charge that Turkish forces have shelled 2 Cyprus towns in violation of the cease-fire.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 9—French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt end 2 days of talks on problems of the Common Market.

July 12—The EEC announces that it has ended its subsidy on cheese exported to the U.S.; U.S. dairy interests opposed the subsidy, charging that it was unfair to U.S. producers. EEC subsidies on butter and skimmed milk products were suspended earlier this year.

July 16—A French spokesman declares that the EEC has agreed to ban beef imports from outside the 9 member nations until November, to try to raise or stabilize beef prices.

International Court of Justice (World Court)

July 25—The World Court rules 10 to 4 that Britain's right to fish off the coast of Iceland is not affected

by Iceland's decision to extend her exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 miles from her coast. Iceland denies that the Court has jurisdiction on the issue.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; Israel*)

July 4—According to informed sources in Cairo, the defense council of the 27-member Arab League has agreed to give financial aid to both the Palestine Liberation Organization and Lebanon to help them to defend themselves against Israeli attack.

July 8—Israeli troops raid 3 ports on the southern Lebanese coast to disrupt alleged Arab preparations for a sea attack against Israel and to retaliate for the June 24 Palestinian raid on the Israeli town of Nahariya.

July 18—In a joint communiqué after 2 days of conferences with Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in Alexandria, Jordan's King Hussein recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of Palestinians outside Jordan and agrees that the organization should be represented at the upcoming Geneva talks on the Middle East. Hussein has been opposed to any recognition of the PLO since the 1970 Palestinian uprising in Jordan.

July 19—The Palestinian news agency Wafa says the PLO rejects the Egypt-Jordan communiqué because it limits the PLO to representation of Palestinians outside Jordan. The PLO claims to represent all Palestinians.

July 23—Israeli military spokesmen report that Israeli planes bombed Palestinian guerrilla targets in southern Lebanon today.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Intl, Cyprus Crisis*)

Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

July 10—In a unanimous decision at the opening of a meeting of OAPEC, Arab oil ministers approve the lifting of the embargo on oil sales to the Netherlands.

United Nations

(See *Intl, Cyprus Crisis*)

ARGENTINA

July 1—President Juan Domingo Perón dies of heart disease. His wife, Vice President Isabel Martinez de Perón, becomes President.

July 4—The commander in chief of the army promises the support of the armed forces to President Isabel Perón. Ricardo Balbín, leader of the Radical Civic Union, also expresses support.

July 8—In an effort to compensate workers for rising

prices and a prohibition on strikes, President Isabel Perón announces that all workers will get a bonus of 1 month's pay.

José López Rega, a controversial government official, will serve as President Perón's personal secretary. He continues also as Minister of Social Welfare.

July 13—The newly elected leader of the labor federation, Adelino Romero, dies of a heart attack. 2 days ago he was elected secretary general of the 3-million-member General Confederation of Workers. He was considered one of the more moderate Peronist labor leaders.

July 15—Former Interior Minister Arturo Mor Roig is shot to death by unidentified terrorists. He is credited with having prepared the way for last year's elections that eventually led to the return of Juan Domingo Perón. Last week, in a similar attack, Leandro Salato, a leading official in the Ministry of Social Welfare, was shot and seriously wounded.

July 31—It is reported by *The New York Times* that the government has agreed to buy the 3 nationwide privately owned television stations.

AUSTRALIA

(See *France*)

AUSTRIA

July 6—Rudolf Kirchschläger assumes the office of President. He is an independent, elected with the support of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and his Socialist party.

BOLIVIA

July 9—The 17-member Cabinet of 12 civilians and 5 military officers resigns. President Hugo Banzer Suarez replaces the Cabinet with an all-military government. The change comes 1 month after an abortive coup by members of the military.

CAMBODIA

July 9—President Lon Nol, in the wake of the government's recapture of Phsar Oudon, the former royal capital, offers to negotiate with the insurgents "without prior conditions."

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in a statement from Peking, flatly refuses to negotiate with Lon Nol.

CANADA

July 8—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is re-elected, defeating his closest rival, Progressive Conservative party leader Robert L. Stanfield. Trudeau's Liberal party increases its membership in the House of Commons by 32 seats, giving it 141 seats out of 264. The vote puts the Liberal party in a majority position in the House.

July 10—Government statistics show an 11.4-percent increase in the consumer price index above the June, 1973, level.

July 31—Voting 92 to 10 (with 8 opponents abstaining), the Quebec National Assembly approves a measure making French the only official language of the Province of Quebec.

CHILE

July 24—The Anaconda Company and the government of Chile reach an agreement on the 1971 Chilean expropriation of two subsidiaries of Anaconda. The company's subsidiaries are to receive \$65 million in cash payments and \$188 million in promissory notes.

July 30—After a mass trial, an air force court martial condemns 4 to death and 56 to prison. The trial of those arrested after the September, 1973, coup against the late President Salvador Allende Gossens began on April 11 and ended in June. At least 96 persons have been executed since the coup.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

July 13—Yang Shou-shan, deputy mayor of Peking, is the 3d Peking official to be criticized in the wall poster campaign that began a month ago in Peking.

July 18—Social disorder is reported in Kiansu province. A radio report monitored in Hong Kong describes disruptions in production, transportation, and communications.

July 20—Premier Chou En-lai makes his first public appearance in two weeks.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East; Germany, Federal Republic of; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

ETHIOPIA

July 1—The army tightens its control over Addis Ababa; some of Emperor Haile Selassie's closest aides are held prisoner.

July 3—The Emperor grants 5 concessions to the army, including amnesty for all political prisoners. General Aman Andom is named chief of staff of the new armed forces, replacing General Wolde Selassie Bereka.

July 9—The army issues a 13-point manifesto setting guidelines for future government. Selassie remains as Emperor with reduced powers; the army takes a major role in Cabinet decisions. The Parliament meets in special session and gives the army the constitution transferring power now held by the Emperor to the Cabinet and Parliament.

July 16—Defense Minister Lieutenant General Abebe Abebe is detained by the armed forces. Abebe is Haile Selassie's son-in-law.

July 18—The army takes control of Asmara, Ethiopia's 2d largest city. The city's mayor and the provincial governor are arrested.

July 22—Premier Endalkachew Makonnen resigns from office. He is replaced by Michael Imru.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, EEC; Germany, Federal Republic of*)

July 3—The government announces that the 3-channel television networks will be divided into 3 independent, competing sections, controlled by the government. A proposal for a private commercial television network is set aside.

July 4—It is announced that no more foreign workers will be permitted to enter the country until October. The government is anticipating a recessionary period and is attempting to preserve employment for Frenchmen.

July 8—Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia claims the French have set off another nuclear device in the Pacific, bringing the total to 2 for this year.

July 16—A leading feminist, Françoise Giroud, is appointed Secretary of State for the Condition of Women. The new Cabinet position was one of the President's campaign promises.

July 26—Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk of New Zealand says that France conducted an atmospheric nuclear test today in French Polynesia; he expresses concern.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

July 21—The Soviet press agency Tass reports that the government plans to prevent passage through its Berlin territory of West German officials attempting to establish an environmental protection office in Berlin. The government charges that such an office would be in violation of the 1971 4-power agreement on Berlin.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, ECC; Germany, Democratic Republic of; Iran; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 5—Egypt and Germany sign an agreement giving Egypt \$200 million in capital aid over the next 3 years. German investments in Egypt will be encouraged; mutual protection against nationalization will be provided.

July 16—A confidant of former Chancellor Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr, is appointed to the Cabinet

by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Bahr will be responsible for the government's foreign aid programs.

GREECE

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis*)

July 5—3 top civilian officials resign in protest over the government's foreign policy toward Cyprus and Turkey. The Foreign Minister, his general secretary, and the director general turn in their resignations.

July 23—The ruling military junta announces that it is returning political power in Greece to civilians. Former Greek Premier Constantine Caramanlis is summoned from self-imposed exile in London to head a new civilian government of national unity. This move by the military junta is apparently a direct result of the crisis in Cyprus and the confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

July 24—Caramanlis forms a center-and-right Cabinet; the government announces that all political prisoners will be released; amnesty is granted for political crimes.

July 26—Caramanlis completes his civilian Cabinet; some leftists are included.

GUATEMALA

July 2—General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García is sworn in as President for a 4-year term.

ICELAND

(See *Intl, Intl Court of Justice*)

July 2—Premier Olafur Johannesson resigns after setbacks in the June 30 elections.

INDIA

July 1—The Congress party selects Food and Agriculture Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, a Muslim, as its nominee for the presidency when V. V. Giri's 5-year term expires in 1975.

July 17—A presidential ordinance institutes a compulsory savings plan for high-income earners (those earning the equivalent of \$2,000 or more) to fight inflation.

IRAN

(See also *United Kingdom*)

July 17—It is announced in Essen, West Germany, and in Teheran that the government is acquiring a 25-percent interest in the Krupp steelworks of West Germany.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Military*)

July 2—Premier Yitzhak Rabin's government announces drastic cutbacks in government spending,

plus new taxes and a pay freeze, to counter inflation and to offset the war deficit.

July 12—Information Minister Aharon Yariv indicates that Israel will negotiate with Palestinian guerrilla organizations if the Palestinians acknowledge the existence of Israel and end hostile actions.

July 15—At a luncheon for the foreign press, Rabin says he sees "no possibility whatsoever" of discussions between Israel and the Palestinian guerrillas.

July 21—After 6 hours of discussion, the Cabinet reaffirms its opposition to any negotiations with Palestinian guerrilla organizations.

ITALY

July 6—The government announces a series of emergency austerity decrees including an average per capita tax rise of \$100 over the next 12 months.

July 9—A series of strikes is called to protest the government's austerity program.

JAPAN

July 7—Elections are held for the upper house of Parliament.

July 9—Returns indicate that Premier Kakuei Tanaka's Liberal-Democratic party won 57 of the 130 seats contested. The 4 opposition parties hold 56 seats.

July 12—Deputy Premier Takeo Miki resigns from the Tanaka government because of a political dispute.

July 16—Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda and Minister of State Shigeru Hori resign because of political disputes with the Cabinet of Premier Tanaka.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Military*)

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 20—Roman Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi is ordered to appear before a military court on charges of plotting to overthrow the government of President Chung Hee Park. 19 people have already been sentenced to death and 24 have been given prison terms ranging from 1 to 15 years. Among those sentenced is the well-known poet, Kim Chi Ha, and the former President of South Korea, Yun Po Sun.

LAOS

July 11—The 3-month-old coalition government dissolves the National Assembly. Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma acts after 2 assembly members plan to protest the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos.

July 13—Prince Souvanna Phouma suffers a mild heart attack.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Military*)

July 1—The government is notified by the Palestine Liberation Organization that it will prevent terrorists from attacking Israel from Lebanon.

MALAYSIA

July 31—Sultan Abdul Halim, the Paramount Ruler, dissolves Parliament and says new elections will be scheduled soon.

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

NETHERLANDS

(See *Intl, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries*)

NEW ZEALAND

(See also *France*)

July 6—The leader of the opposition National party, John R. Marshall, retires.

PERU

July 27—The military government expropriates the nation's 8 major independent newspapers.

POLAND

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

PORTUGAL

July 2—French Socialist leader François Mitterrand arrives for a 4-day visit. He will attend Socialist rallies throughout the countryside in an attempt to bolster the Portuguese Socialists' following.

July 4—Agricultural workers begin striking for better wages.

July 6—New measures are announced by the government in an attempt to combine economic incentives with the establishment of social justice.

July 9—Premier Adelino da Palma Carlos and 4 of his ministers resign.

July 11—President António de Spínola dissolves the 2-month-old provisional Cabinet.

July 13—President Spínola names Colonel Vasco de Gonçalves as Premier. He is a leading member of the Armed Forces Movement, which overthrew the government in April.

July 27—Spínola promises to begin at once the transfer of power to the people of Portugal's 3 African territories.

July 29—Spínola says that Portuguese Guinea will be the 1st Portuguese African territory to receive independence.

RHODESIA

July 31—For the 3d successive time since 1962, Prime Minister Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front wins 77 per cent of the votes and all 50 seats reserved for whites in yesterday's general election.

SIKKIM

July 4—King Palden Thondup Namgyal signs a new constitution, drafted by an Indian jurist, giving himself only figurehead status. The constitution provides that the new chief executive be named by India.

SOUTH AFRICA

July 11—The vice president of the Atomic Energy Board announces that South Africa has the ability to produce a nuclear bomb.

SPAIN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 19—Generalissimo Francisco Franco turns over his powers to Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, his designated successor.

July 23—Dr. Manuel Huerta, head of the Francisco Franco hospital, announces that Franco has completely recovered and can return to his position as chief of state.

THAILAND

July 5—After 3 nights of fighting between rioters and police in the Chinese district of Bangkok, 25 people are dead and 178 are wounded.

Premier Sanya Dharmasakti and his Cabinet meet in special session to plan measures to end the fighting.

TURKEY

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 1—The government lifts its ban on opium poppy cultivation. The ban has been in effect since 1971 at the request of the U.S. government.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 4—A Soyuz spacecraft is launched for possible link-up with an orbiting Salyut research station put into orbit on Tuesday.

July 19—The 15-day Soyuz 14 mission ends successfully, completing a rehearsal for next year's U.S.-Soviet flight.

Party Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev arrives in Warsaw for the celebration of Poland's 30th anniversary as a Communist nation.

July 20—The government warns West Germany

against establishing an environmental protection office in West Berlin, claiming that it violates the 4-power agreement on Berlin since it would be an agency of the West German government.

July 26—The newly elected Supreme Soviet approves and installs Nikolai V. Podgorny as Chairman (President) of the Supreme Soviet and Aleksei N. Kosygin as Premier for new 4-year terms.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, Cyprus, World Court*)

July 11—The visible trade deficit for June narrows slightly from the record level in May.

July 18—A bomb explodes in the cellar armory of the Tower of London, killing 1 and injuring 42.

July 22—Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey announces a \$1.2-billion loan from Iran to help finance the trade deficit.

Northern Ireland

July 4—The British government calls for new elections. The voters are to choose a "constitutional convention," which is to draft proposals for a new political structure. The results must be approved by Parliament in London.

UNITED STATES

Administration

July 8—A 3-judge special panel of the U.S. Customs Court in New York rules unanimously that President Richard M. Nixon had no authority to impose a 10 percent surcharge on all dutiable imports in 1971. The ruling, which might result in \$500 million in refunds to importers, will be appealed by the government.

July 16—The President names Bert A. Gallegos to replace Alvin Arnett as director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Arnett has been dismissed because of his policy differences with the White House.

Economy

July 3—The Bankers Trust Company, Continental Illinois of Chicago, and several major banks on the West Coast raise their prime interest rate to 12 percent.

July 5—The Department of Labor reports that in June for the 5th straight month the nation's unemployment rate remained stable at 5.2 percent.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Veterans Administration announce simultaneously that interest rates on federally insured mortgages will be allowed to rise from 8¾ to 9 percent on July 8.

July 8—The Dow-Jones industrial average drops 21.20 points, to close at 770.57, its lowest point since November 23, 1970.

July 11—The President meets with 25 of the nation's prominent business executives and economists to discuss inflation.

July 18—The Department of Commerce reports that the gross national product in the 2d quarter declined at a rate of 1.2 percent. The 1st quarter decline was 7 percent. The inflation rate declined from 12.3 percent in the 1st quarter to 8.8 percent in the 2d.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Turkey*)

July 2—Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev announces in Moscow that he and President Nixon have agreed on an underground nuclear test limitation and on a lowered ceiling for defensive missile systems, but not on a control of offensive missile systems.

A State Department spokesman says the U.S. regrets the Turkish decision to resume opium poppy cultivation.

July 3—Concluding 6 days of conferences in Moscow and at Yalta, President Nixon and Brezhnev sign a communiqué pledging that their nations will negotiate an interim arms control agreement to remain effective until 1985.

The President returns to the U.S. after his Moscow summit meeting; he tells the nation that chances for peace are "the brightest in a generation."

President Nixon and Brezhnev sign a joint communiqué announcing that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed in principle to open new consulates in New York City and Kiev.

July 4—At a news conference in Brussels, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were unable to agree on how to balance missile totals and warhead totals; this was the chief obstacle to agreement on permanent curbs on nuclear offensive arms.

July 5—The U.S. and Czechoslovakia initial a preliminary agreement to settle financial claims against one another incurred during World War II.

July 9—In Madrid at the end of a European tour, Kissinger initials a new statement of military cooperation between Spain and the U.S.

July 11—At a 148-nation U.N. conference on the Law of the Sea, the U.S. reveals that it will accept a 200-mile offshore limit for an economic zone and a 12-mile outer limit for the territorial sea, if the limits are part of an acceptable overall agreement. The U.S. has always supported the 17th century 3-mile territorial sea limit.

In Mexico City, the U.S. Embassy reveals that the body of vice consul John S. Patterson has been identified; Patterson was kidnapped March 22.

Impeachment Proceedings

(See also *U.S., Political Scandal, Supreme Court*)

July 24—The House Judiciary Committee begins public, televised debate on whether to recommend the impeachment of President Nixon.

July 27—The House Judiciary Committee votes 27 to 11 to approve the 1st article of impeachment, charging the President with personally engaging in a "course of conduct" designed to obstruct justice in the Watergate cover-up.

July 29—Voting 28 to 10, the House Judiciary Committee approves a 2d article of impeachment, charging the President with misuse of power because of his repeated failure to carry out his oath to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

July 30—The House Judiciary Committee votes 21 to 17 to recommend a 3d article of impeachment, charging the President with unconstitutional defiance of the committee's subpoenas. Two articles dealing with the secret bombing of Cambodia and the President's alleged evasion of federal income taxes are defeated.

Legislation

July 1—According to an Associated Press story released today, the White House announced yesterday that the President has signed a bill authorizing the continuance of federal spending at current rates through September 30 and a bill raising the national debt limit to a record \$495-billion high.

July 11—Voting 64 to 31, the Senate approves the repeal of the "no-knock" provision of federal drug legislation; according to a 1970 statute, federal narcotic agents and policemen in the District of Columbia are authorized to get court warrants for forcible "no-knock" entry into a home or office where narcotics possession is suspected. The repealed amendment goes to the House.

July 12—The President signs the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

July 17—Accepting a House compromise, the Senate passes and sends to the White House a House bill that will provide \$2-billion worth of guaranteed loans for livestock producers. Yesterday the House approved the bill, 210 to 204. The program, which will be effective for 1 year with an optional 6-month extension at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture, will provide guaranteed loans to producers of beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, chickens and turkeys.

July 18—Voting 77 to 19, the Senate completes congressional action on a bill establishing a permanent program of federal legal aid for the poor. The bill goes to the White House.

July 31—Voting 323 to 83, the House approves a compromise education bill authorizing \$29 billion in

federal programs to aid education in the next 4 years. The bill, which goes to the White House, limits the busing of children to achieve desegregation.

Military

July 9—The Defense Department releases official estimates of arms sales for fiscal 1974: the U.S. sold \$8.5 billion in arms, almost double the arms sales of the previous fiscal year. Some \$7 billion in arms went to the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas, not including \$1.5-billion worth of arms given free of charge to Israel plus several million dollars worth of arms given to Jordan and Lebanon.

Political Scandal

(See also *U.S., Impeachment Proceedings, Supreme Court*)

July 8—Former presidential assistant John D. Ehrlichman denies that he authorized the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding. Ehrlichman and 3 others have been charged with conspiring to violate Fielding's civil rights.

July 9—The House Judiciary Committee publishes transcripts of 8 tapes of the President's conversations with regard to Watergate; the tapes are markedly different from the edited transcripts made public by the White House.

U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica refuses to delay or dismiss the Watergate cover-up conspiracy case or to move it out of Washington.

July 10—In a 33-page indictment, a federal grand jury charges Senator Edward J. Gurney (R., Fla.) and 6 others of operating an influence-peddling and extortion racket for the past 3½ years. Gurney denies the charges.

Testifying in a letter to U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, the President says he did not authorize the search of Dr. Fielding's files and that Ehrlichman had "general supervisory control" of the "plumbers" unit set up to stop leaks of security information.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, testifying for less than 2 minutes at the Ehrlichman trial, denies that he authorized or had any knowledge of a plan to obtain psychological information about Ellsberg from the files of his psychiatrist.

White House officials reveal that the President personally decided to withhold a portion of a March 22, 1973, conversation that dealt with a cover-up of the Watergate affair because the excerpt was "of dubious relevancy" to the President's role.

July 11—The House Judiciary Committee publishes a 4,133-page record of evidence it has received in its inquiry into the possible impeachment of President Nixon because of his alleged role in the Watergate

affair. This is the first of 7 installments in the release of evidence compiled by the committee.

Richard Ben Veniste, an assistant special Watergate prosecutor, reveals to Judge Sirica that a 19-minute gap in one of the White House tapes has been discovered; another tape was supposedly torn during its transcription.

July 12—Ehrlichman and 3 others are found guilty of conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Fielding. Ehrlichman is also found guilty of 3 out of 4 counts of making false statements.

July 13—In its last official action, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Watergate committee) releases a final report including a suggestion for sweeping reform of laws relating to elections and electoral campaigns.

July 18—In a 225-page document submitted to the House Judiciary Committee by his lawyers and made public, President Nixon argues that White House surveillance to stop the leaking of confidential information was designed for national security and does not constitute an impeachable offense.

July 19—Senior counsels to both Democrats and Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee urge the committee to vote for the President's impeachment on one or more of 5 charges.

Ehrlichman files a motion asking for acquittal and a new trial, charging that his trial was unfair.

Special counsel John Doar gives the House Judiciary Committee a 306-page summary of evidence against the President.

July 20—In an affidavit included in the evidence compiled and released for publication by the House Judiciary Committee, former Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson reveals that the President imposed limitations on former special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox even before he took the post and threatened to fire him several times before he fired him on October 20, 1973.

July 21—Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee reveal that Samuel A. Garrison 3d has replaced Albert E. Jenner, Jr., as counsel to the Republican minority on the committee because Jenner, who has urged the President's impeachment, no longer represents the Republican minority.

July 22—Garrison opposes the impeachment of the President unless it appears probable that he will be convicted by the Senate.

U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell dismisses 1 of 4 felony counts on which Ehrlichman was convicted in connection with the burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

July 27—A federal jury finds California's Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke guilty of perjury in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing into I.T.T. contributions to the President's reelection campaign.

July 29—Former Secretary of the Treasury John B.

Connally is indicted by a federal grand jury on 5 counts of bribery, perjury and conspiracy to obstruct justice, with regard to funds he allegedly accepted from the Associated Milk Producers, Inc.

July 30—11 of the 64 subpoenaed White House tapes are delivered to Judge Sirica.

July 31—Harold S. Nelson, former head of the nation's largest milk cooperative, pleads guilty to a charge of conspiring to bribe Connally.

U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell sentences Ehrlichman to 20 months to 5 years in prison. Ehrlichman will appeal the decision.

Supreme Court

(See also *U.S., Impeachment Proceedings, Political Scandal*)

July 9—Former Chief Justice Earl Warren dies at the age of 83.

July 10—The Court refuses a request from officials of the state of Minnesota to make effective at once a federal district court order forbidding the Reserve Mining Company from polluting Lake Superior. On June 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit gave the company a 70-day reprieve.


July 24—The Supreme Court rules 8 to 0 (with Justice William Rehnquist abstaining) that the President does not have an absolute constitutional right to keep his records confidential; in this case, the interests of fairness in criminal justice outweigh the claims of executive privilege. Thus, the President must surrender tape recordings and other material involving 64 White House conversations for use in the Watergate cover-up trial; the Court orders the President to comply "forthwith" with Judge Sirica's order to surrender the material for screening and subsequent submission of all relevant data to Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski. The Watergate grand jury action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up is left standing. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger announces the decision.

In a statement from San Clemente read by the President's counsel, James St. Clair, the President says he will comply with the Court's ruling "in all respects."

July 25—In a 5-4 ruling, the Court rules that segregation in a city's school system cannot be remedied by combining city school districts with suburban districts unless both school systems are discriminatory. The case involves busing in Detroit and its suburbs.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF

July 14—Elections are held for 55 city and municipal councillors. The councillors will have a role in local administration as well as in choosing next year's presidential candidates.



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